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UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL BROILER
MARKETING ASSOCIATION: WILL THE
CHICKEN LICKIN' STAND?
CHARLES GORDON BROWN"
Most of the nation's major broiler producers are skeptical of the
wisdom of the old adage "build a better mouse trap and the world will beat a
path to your door." The broiler industry built a better mouse trap all right.
Sweeping technological and organizational innovations have transformed
the industry into one of major agricultural importance. From a meager $19
million in 1934,2 gross farm income from broilers soared to $2.9 billion in
1975, 3 a more than fifteen hundred percent increase in just four decades.
The remarkable growth of the industry has been accompanied by an even
more remarkable phenomenon: broilers are cheaper today than ever before,
despite escalating production costs, 4 because the efficiency of the industry
has kept prices low.' The broiler industry's mouse trap has been so success-
ful, in fact, that it has become a model for other areas of agricultural
production.
6
But the news is not all good. Among those beating a path to the broiler
producers' doors was the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law;
B.A. 1972, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1975, University of Virginia.
From 1975 to 1977, the author was associated with the Atlanta, Georgia, law firm of
Alston, Miller & Gaines, attorneys for the National Broiler Marketing Association (NBMA).
While so associated, the author performed legal services on behalf of NBMA relating to this
antitrust litigation. The author is no longer associated in any way with Alston, Miller & Gaines
or NBMA. This article is based solely on facts available to the public generally and does not
divulge any information or facts communicated by the client to its attorneys. The opinions
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. Broilers are young chickens eight to ten weeks old. Their meat is typically more tender
than that of older, heavier chickens such as hens. Broilers (also called "fryers" or "young
chickens") are raised exclusively for consumption, and are a distinct agricultural product
readily differentiated in the market from hens, turkeys, ducks and other types of poultry. F.
FABER & R. IRVIN, THE CHICKEN BROILER INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, PRACTICES AND COSTS I
(Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Marketing Research Report No. 930,
1971).
2. V. BENSON & T. WITzIG, THE CHICKEN BROILER INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, PRAC-
TICES, AND COSTS 4 table I (Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultur-
al Econ. Report No. 381, 1977).
3. Id.
4. In 1940, producers received an average of 17.3 cents per pound. In 1934, the price per
pound had been 19.3 cents. The price reached a high of 36 cents per pound in 1948, a low of 13.3
cents per pound in 1967. Id. The inflation of the 1970's caused production costs to rise
significantly. The average price per pound in 1976 was 23.6 cents. Id. This represents a price
increase of 36% between 1940 and 1976. Wholesale prices for standard domestic commodities
over the same period rose an average of almost 350%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1976, at 432 table 699 (97th ed.
1976) (derived) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]; see text accompanying note 106 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
6. See text accompaning note 145 infra.
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of Justice. The resulting litigation, styled United States v. National Broiler
Marketing Association,7 is now before the United States Supreme Court.
The high Court's decision should become a landmark boon or bane for both
the agricultural and consuming sectors of the economy. The issues presented
by the Chicken Case extend far beyond the broiler industry, and the impact
of its final resolution will be felt throughout agriculture.
The Chicken Case marks the first judicial surfacing of a multidimen-
sional controversy that has preoccupied farmers, businessmen, politicians
and some legal commentators for years. 8 The central issues are three: (1)
Shall off-farm integrators 9 (sometimes called "agribusiness") be allowed to
participate and compete in the production, processing and marketing of
agricultural commodities; (2) assuming off-farm integrators shall be allowed
to participate and compete in agriculture, shall they also be permitted to
avail themselves of the antitrust exemption of the Capper-Volstead Act10
and related statutes; and (3) if the answer to the previous question is
affirmative, what standard shall be used, from an antitrust standpoint, to
determine which off-farm integrators shall be allowed to join or form
agricultural cooperatives? 1
Part I of this article examines the industrial and market pressures
experienced by those engaged in agricultural pursuits, with specific empha-
sis on the trend toward horizontal and vertical coordination among individu-
al production units. The broiler industry, whose reaction to these industrial
and market pressures typifies what is happening in other parts of the
agricultural sector, is examined in detail as a case history. Based on the
material developed in Part I, Part II attempts to answer each of the three
7." 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,509 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd., 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 260 (1977) (No. 77-117). The government suit has also hatched a number of
private treble damage class actions. There are now 23 separate actions consolidated before the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. In re Chicken Antitrust
Litigation, No. C 74-2454A (N.D. Ga.). Proposals for the settlement of many of these private
actions are now before the district court for its approval. None of the proposed classes had
been certified as of Oct. 27, 1977 [hereinafter, the National Broiler Marketing Association shall
be referred to as "NBMA" and the litigation in which it is involved as the "Chicken Case"].
8. A sampler of the various opinions of representative groups in the public and private
sectors may be found in Hearings on H.R. 11654 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Family Farm
Act Hearings].
9. See note 18 infra.
10. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1970).
11. An agricultural cooperative is a business organization, usually incorporated,
owned and controlled by member agricultural producers, which operates for the
mutual benefit of its members or stockholders, as producers or patrons, on a cost basis
after allowing for the expenses of operation and maintenance and any other authorized
deductions for expansion and necessary reserves.
FARMER COOPERATIVE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LEGAL PHASES OF FARMER
COOPERATIVES, FCS INFO. 100, at 3 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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questions raised above. Because of the immediate relevance of the Chicken
Case to these three issues, this article endeavors to resolve them with
specific reference to that case, rather than solely as a matter of abstract
principle.
I. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND HORIZONTAL POWER
A. Vertically Integrated Agriculture
The characteristics and performance of "vertically integrated" agricul-
ture are central to an understanding of the significance of the Chicken Case
and how its resolution will affect the agricultural segment of the economy as
a whole. The meat, vegetables and other agricultural products purchased by
the consumer at his or her local supermarket are the result of a multilevel
production process. Generally, these commodities pass through five vertical
stages 12 before they reach the consumer's shopping basket: (1) input of raw
materials and production resources (feed, seed, growing stock, machinery,
equipment and accessories, transportation and energy); (2) commodity
production (actual planting, cultivation and harvesting of crops or raising of
livestock); (3) production adjuncts (insecticides, medicines, vaccines and
other veterinary care, fertilizer and irrigation); (4) handling and processing
(transportation and storage, and transformation of commodity to a form
usable by consumer); and (5) marketing and distribution (location and
selection of buyers, and sale and delivery of commodity at best price).
Farmers typically buy their inputs from off-farm sources and sell their
outputs to or through off-farm outlets. Their chief function in the chain is
limited to commodity production. The other four stages are primarily in the
hands of off-farm businesses.
13
12. Production stages vary from corpmodity t6 commodity and any attempt to generalize
the number of stages without due regard to the function of each stage is fruitless. Professor
Roy, for example, does not distinguish between input of raw materials and production adjuncts.
See E. Roy, CONTRACT FARMING AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 fig. 1-1 (2d ed. 1972). However,
for some commodities, the distinction between production inputs and production adjuncts is
made. See F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 4, which illustrates the functional relationship
between stages of input, production and supply of production adjuncts. For the purposes of this
article, the five tier production chain is adopted.
13. This has not always been the case. The yeoman farmer idealized by Thomas Jefferson
was totally integrated. Scientific horticulture or husbandry was virtually unknown. The farmer
supplied his own seeds and breeding stock, raised his own crops and livestock, and did his own
harvesting and slaughtering. He consumed what he required and sold the surplus, usually in
local markets. Jefferson might have called him "self-sufficient." The industrial revolution and
the vast social, technological and commercial changes brought by it soon had to be reckoned
with by the yeoman farmer and disintegrated the bliss of self-sufficiency. On the input side, the
farmer became reliant on off-farm sources for equipment, seeds, feeds and breeder stock. O
the output side, the farmer became dependent on off-farm processors, transporters and market-
ers. See generally E. Roy, supra note 12, at 1, 18, 279-80.
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An "integrator" assembles two or more of the five stages described
above under his own control.' 4 This assembly is called "integration" or
"vertical integration."' 5 The farmer who sets up his own processing facility
or does his own marketing is an integrator. 16 Groups of farmers can also
integrate by joining or forming cooperative associations organized for the
purposes of acquiring production inputs and production adjuncts, or for
collectively handling, processing or marketing their output. 17 Off-farml8
businesses such as feed mills, hatcheries and processors can also be inte-
grators. 19
Integration may come about through internal expansion, through out-
side acquisition or by contract. 20 If, for example, a group of sugar beet
producers forms a cooperative and builds a beet sugar processing plant,
21
vertical integration is achieved through internal growth. If a potato grower
cooperative purchases the plant and equipment of a potato processor,
22
vertical integration occurs by acquisition. If the sugar beet producers and
potato growers lack or are unwilling to risk the financial resources necessary
to build or acquire processing facilities, they can enter into growing con-
tracts with various commercial processors for the sale of specified quantities
of beets or potatoes at agreed upon prices. 23 This last example illustrates a
form of integration by contract.24 Of the three means of achieving vertical
integration, integration by contract is the most prevalent.
25
14. Id. at 3, 18.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 6, 20, 524-40.
18. Throughout this article, the term "off-farm" integrator or "off-farm" firm shall be
used to designate businesses that began in the nonfarm (nonproduction) sector. Because of their
integration, forward or backward, into the production stage, however, these enterprises have
most certainly become involved in the production of commodities. Thus, the term "off-farm"
is used only to differentiate farming enterprises by their origins. It should not be construed as
an indication that the "off-farm" firm is not engaged in farming. The term "on-farm" shall
designate farm-based producers.
19. See E. Roy, supra note 12, at 6.
20. Id. at 5-6, 19.
21. E.g., Beet Growers to Build$55.8 Million Plant, 40 NEWS FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES,
Mar. 1974, at 7.
22. E.g., Mobley, Potato Growers Form Processor Co-op to Reactivate Plant, 43 FARMER
COOPERATIVES, Nov. 1976, at 15.
23. E. Roy, supra note 12, at 5-6. For an example in grain marketing, see Thurston, Grain
Marketing Agreements Provide Different Approach, 43 FARMER COOPERATIVES, Dec. 1976, at 4.
24. Integration by contract assumes a variety of forms and achieves varying degrees of
integration. Professor Roy analyzed integrated relationships in specified commodities and
found six different forms in use in hatching egg production, thirteen in broiler production,
eleven in turkey production, eight in table egg production, eleven in market hog production and
five in beef cattle production. E. Roy, supra note 12, at 93-100, 118-32, 157-65, 185-94, 236-42,
285-93. The contract relationship may be developed between enterprises in any two stages of
the production chain.
25. Id. at 3.
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The objective of vertical integration is closer coordination between the
otherwise independent and often disjointed stages in the food production
chain.26 Numerous advantages are associated with this coordination.27 Pro-
duction and marketing costs per unit of output are reduced, and production
and marketing technologies, as well as the quality of the product, are
improved. Production and market risks at any one stage can be minimized
by using profits from one stage to subsidize losses at another, thus enhanc-
ing the overall stability and viability of the enterprise. ]By eliminating
middlemen and multiple ownership stages, the cost of delivered products is
less, especially when the middlemen have themselves been inefficient or
exploitative. Vertical integration also protects against shortages of supply
through closer coordination between output and market demand.
28
The defendants in the Chicken Case are predominantly off-farm inte-
grators who, through contract growing arrangements, produce approximate-
ly fifty percent of all the broilers consumed in the United States. 29 The
government's suit does not, however, challenge defendants' vertical ac-
tivities. Rather, the antitrust objection is to defendants' horizontal associa-
tion as members of NBMA. 0 There is, however, an important relationship
between vertical integration and horizontal power.
B. The Necessity of Horizontal Power and Coordination
Vertical integration has compiled an enviable track record for many
commodities. The efficient coordination of the vertical stages of production,
however, avail the producer little if his product is perishable, his production
decisions are unenlightened in view of market indicators, and oligopsony
confronts him in the marketplace. The average producer cannot live on
vertical integration alone-he must have horizontal power. The historic
cooperative and marketing legislation enacted by Congress during this
century has recognized this principle.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 31 the Capper-Volstead Act,32 the
26. See Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 21 (testimony of J. Phil Campbell,
Under Secretary of Agriculture).
27. Of course, vertical integration can entail disadvantages. Some of them, listed by
Professor Roy, include inflexibility of operation, management complexity, increased overhead
cost, lack of alternative opportunities for invested capital, incompatible stages of operation,
creation of less competitive markets and the obscuring of inefficient stages in the vertical
systdm. E. Roy, supra note 12, at 18.
28. Id.
29. Amended Government Complaint 7 (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review).
30. NBMA was accused of combining and conspiring "to fix, maintain and stabilize" the
price of broilers in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970) & Supp. V 1975). Amended Government Complaint 8.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (19760r
32. 7 id. §§ 291-292.
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Cooperative Marketing Act of 192613 and the Agricultural Marketing Acts
of 192911 and 194635 were designed to foster both market power and market
coordination. Congress decided to give the producer a sufficient degree of
market power to alleviate the disparity in bargaining positions between
producers and off-farm suppliers, processors and other "middlemen." ' 36
Congress also wanted to allow the producer to gain sufficient power,
through horizontal affiliation with other producers, to integrate vertically
and compete directly with "middlemen" in bringing commodities to the
consumer at the lowest possible prices. 37 The lawmakers also envisioned a
certain degree of vertical and horizontal coordination, especially with regard
to the origination and dissemination of market information and the market-
ing of agricultural products. 38 A principal goal was the closer coordination
of the various stages of the food chain to avoid disastrous cycles of gluts and
shortages.
39
The state of American agriculture during the first two decades of this
century was precarious. Based on farm size and numbers, 40 farming
epitomized the economist's competitive model. The markets to which these
farms sold their output, however, were not so competitive. Dominated by
large processing trusts and institutional middlemen, 41 farmers parted with
their crops and livestock for what they were offered, not what they asked. 42
Furthermore, the individual farmer had no way to gauge demand because his
markets were distant and impersonal. 43 Congress's solution was to permit
33. Id. §§ 451-457.
34. 12 id. §§ 1141b-1141j.
35. 7 id. §§ 1621-1629 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
36. See text accompanying note 223 infra.
37. See notes 228-29 and accompanying text infra.
38. See note 226 and accompanying text infra.
39. See note 227 and accompanying text infra.
40. Of 6,448,343 farms in 1920, 59% had less than 100 acres; 81% had less than 175 acres.
ABsrRAcr, supra note 4, at 647 table 587 (53d ed. 1931).
41. The Federal Trade Commission was aware of the manipulation of markets to the
disadvantage of farmers. An investigation was commenced of the "Harvester" and "Packer"
trusts and the Corn Products Refining Monopoly. President Wilson included reform of market-
ing channels in his New Freedom program, and Congress obliged by passing the United States
Cotton Futures Act of 1914, ch. 255, 38 Stat. 693, United States Grain Standards Act, ch. 313,
39 Stat. 482 (1916), and the United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, 39 Stat. 486 (1916). J.
SHIDELER, FARM CRIsis 1919-1923, at 8 (1957). See also Campbell, Cooperatives: A Necessary
Family Farm Marketing Tool, 41 NEws FOR FARMER COOPERAirVES, Aug. 1974, at 14 (brief
history of the market problems that gave rise to the cooperative movement).
42. Congress was aware of the disadvantageous bargaining position of the farmer. The
House report on the proposed Capper-Volstead bill surmised: "Whenever a farmer seeks to sell
his products he meets in the market place the representatives of vast aggregations of organized
capital that largely determine the price of his products. Personally he has very little if anything
to say about the price." H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921). See also 62 CONo.
REc. 2262 (remarks of Senator Hitchcock), 2058 (1922) (remarks of Senator Capper).
43. See 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922) (remarks of Senator Capper). The dislocations caused
by lack of coordination between production, marketing and demand prompted one senator to
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
the nation's farmers to band together horizontally and to operate vertically
for the purposes of self-help.
As enacted in 1914, section 6 of the Clayton Act" removed the
Sherman Act's 45 prohibition against horizontal combinations in restraint of
trade for certain "agricultural organizations."' This legislation was fol-
lowed some eight years, one world war and a severe agricultural depres-
sion47 later by the Capper-Volstead Act. 48 In positive terms, 49 Capper-
Volstead sanctioned the right of agricultural producers50 to "act together in
associations" 51 for the purposes of acquiring and exercising market pow-
er. 52 In addition to its provision for horizontal power, Capper-Volstead
authorized associations of producers to engage in certain vertical activities
query: "How many times have you seen, in days past, the apple crop in New England rotting on
the ground and apples at a high price in the City of New York?" Id. at 2052 (remarks of Senator
Kellogg). See also 60 id. at 373 (1920) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
45. Id. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
46. Section 6 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of. . .agricultural. . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit. . . nor shall such organiza-
tions, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id. § 17 (1970).
47. With the end of World War I, agriculture slipped into an acute depression. A price
panic in 1920-21 dropped the prices of the ten leading crops by two-thirds in twelve months. J.
SHIDELER, supra note 41, at 46, 79-80.
48. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1970).
49. Section 6 of the Clayton Act carved out an exception to the Sherman Act. It did not
provide that individual farmers could organize themselves. It merely stated that "agricultural
organizations" would not be held to be illegal combinations and conspiracies. 15 id. § 17. The
efficacy of the agricultural organizations authorized by § 6 was further weakened by the
prohibition against capital stock and for-profit operation. Id. The Capper-Volstead Act cast the
§ 6 exemption in positive terms and removed any doubt, within limits, about the antitrust
immunity of cooperatives. It also authorized cooperatives to issue capital stock. 7 id. § 291.
50. The Act authorizes cooperative activities for "[plersons engaged in the production of
agricultural products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers." 7 id. §
291. Unless the producer is a farmer (or other approved entity), he may not partake of the
benefits of cooperation. The central issue in the Chicken Case is whether NBMA's integrator-
members are "farmers" within the meaning of the Act.
51. Id.
52. Although the purpose of the Act is to allow agricultural producers to acquire some
degree of market power, § 2 of the Act, id. § 292 (1970), authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture
to order agricultural associations to cease and desist from monopolizing or restraining trade in
interstate commerce if the effect of *cooperation is to "unduly enhance" the price of any
agricultural products. The effectiveness of § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act is highly suspect.
See Note, Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust Exemption for
Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 379 (1975). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON ANTrrRUST IMMUNITIES 12 (1977); Price Enhancement: A
Progress Report, 43 FARMER COOPERATIVES, Mar. 1977, at 22, 23; Undue Price Enhancement-
A Myth?, id. at 10; Statement of Donald I. Baker, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, before the House Subcomm. on Monopoly and Commercial Law of the Comm. on
the Judiciary 18 (Mar. 29, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
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such as processing, preparing for market, handling and marketing. 53
Subsequent to the enactment of Capper-Volstead, Congress crafted
three more pieces of legislation to foster horizontal and vertical coordination
in the marketplace. The Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 authorized
cooperative associations to "acquire, exchange, interpret and disseminate"
present or prospective market, statistical and economic data to their mem-
bers or to other associations. 54 The 1926 Act also established the forerunner
of the Farmers Cooperative Service55 and vested it with statutory responsi-
bility for conducting economic research and market analysis and for provid-
ing organizational, operational, financial and merchandizing advice and
other services. 56 Among the catalogued vertical activities specifically re-
ferred to in the 1926 Act are warehousing, manufacturing, storage, coopera-
tive purchasing of farm supplies, credit, financing, insurance and "other
cooperative activities."
57
The 1926 Act was followed by the Agricultural Marketing Acts of
192958 and 1946.59 The 1929 Act focused on the problem of market instabil-
ity and sought to curb speculation, to make commodity distribution more
efficient and to encourage cooperative marketing. 60 The 1946 Act, like its
predecessor, promoted the development of orderly markets and efficient
distribution. 61 In particular, the 1946 Act sought to streamline distribution
by improving procurement, storage, processing, handling, inspection and
transportation systems.
62
It is significant that Congress implicitly recognized that agriculture's
salvation depended upon its horizontal and vertical development.63 Without
53. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) provides, in pertinent part, that
[p]ersons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters,
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in associations, corporate
or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for
market, handling, and marketing . . . such products of persons so engaged. Such
associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and their
members may make the'necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes
54. Id. § 455.
55. The Farmer Cooperative Service's predecessor was called the Division of Cooperative
Marketing. Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, ch. 725, § 2, 44 Stat. 802 (1927). A concise
history of the development and shifting responsibilities of the FCS is collected in 43 FARMER
COOPERAIVES, July 1976, at 3-23.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 453(b)(1) to (7) (1970).
57. Id. § 453(a).
58. 12 id. §§ 1141b-1141j.
59. 7 id. §§ 1621-1629 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
60. 12 id. § 1141(a)(1) to (4) (1970).
61. 7 id. § 1622(d), (e), (g),-(k).
62. Id. § 1622(a)-(c), (h)-(j), (l)-(n).
63. A. W. Mellon, while Secretary of the Treasury, succinctly underscored the relation-
ship between horizontal and vertical activities when he testified on the proposed Cooperative
Marketing Act of 1926:
[Vol. 56
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vertical coordination, market dislocations and inefficiencies would continue
despite horizontal power. 64 Without horizontal power and coordination,
even the most efficient synchronization of production stages would not
offset the adverse effects of uninformed decisionmaking and unequal bar-
gaining power. 65 Against these two dimensions-horizontal and vertical-
of modern agriculture, the future role of off-farm integrators must be
appraised. NBMA and the broiler industry provide a good case study.
C. Vertical and Horizontal Performance in the Broiler Industry
Vertical integration now accounts for a significant portion of domestic
agricultural production. In 1970, thirty-one percent of all livestock products
and ten percent of all crops were produced under contract with off-farm
integrators or cooperatives. 66 Another five percent of livestock and crop
production occurred under other forms of vertical integration. 67 Broilers are
produced almost exclusively through integrated systems.
68
1. History and Present Day Structure
That white-frocked Kentucky colonel is fortunate not to have been born
fifty years ago. Had he been, he would have been lickin' beef, pork or
mutton off his fingers instead of chicken. Fifty years ago there were no
"broilers" 69 and there was no broiler industry. 70 Commercially produced
A way out of the difficulties lies in the elimination of waste between the producer and
the consumer, so that the farmer may receive a higher net price and yet the ultimate
consumer may not have to pay more. This purpose can be approached through more
orderly marketing and cooperation.
67 CONG. REC. 11266-67 (1926) (emphasis supplied).
64. Wherever extortion in farm products has been practiced it has been done after the
farmer parted with his products. It seems to me to be absolutely necessary, if we are to
consider the economic good of the country, that this increase of cost should be
avoided if possible, to the end that the producer and the consumer both might benefit.
If by allowing cooperative understandings [horizontal] we can shorten the distance
between producer and consumer and eliminate the toll gates on the way [vertical] the
farmer and the consumer will both be benefitted.
62 id. at 2216 (1922) (remarks of Senator Townsend).
65. "The main object of the cooperative assocation is to get reasonable prices for the
farmer ...." Id. at 2049 (remarks of Senator Kellogg).
66. Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 21-22.
67. Id. at 22-23. For certain commodities, the percentage of total output produced under
some form of vertical integration was relatively high; among these were wholesale milk (98%).
turkeys (54%), eggs (40%), cattle (35%), sugar beets and sugar cane (100%), tomatoes, sweet
corn and green beans (95%), citrus fruits (85%) and potatoes (70%). Id. at 25-28.
68. 97% in 1970. Id. at 28. In 1977, 91% of all broilers are produced under contract.
Another 8% are produced by ititegrators directly. Independent production accounts for less
than 1%. V. BENSON & T. WrrziG, supra note 2, at 11.
69. The broiler of today is a different commodity from that of the 1920's. Before the
development of modem broiler production, "broilers" consisted of "rather tough-meated hens
culled from laying flocks, and the male half of the replacement hatch, the latter killed off at
from 15 to 30 weeks of age." B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, DYNAMICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE
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chicken was almost exclusively the seasonal by-product of the annual
springtime hatch of laying hens.7' The eating chicken of that era, the "June
Fryer," was popular, but its output was so limited and so seasonal that
regular markets and mass consumption had never developed. 72
The economic history of the broiler industry recounts the discovery of
and the effective response to consumer demand for a good eating chicken.
73
As supermarket retailing74 and restauranting 75 developed during the 1920's
and 1930's, egg producers began to realize the potential year-round market
for their springtime by-products. 76 Year-round production was initiated,
enjoyed success and expanded.77 Between 1934 and 1940 broiler output
quadrupled. 78 World War II further accelerated the industry's already rapid
development. 79 In response to wartime demand, industry output more than
doubled between 1940 and 1945.80 During the post-war years, substantial
advances in production technology upgraded the quality of the meat8' and
streamlined the production process.82 With financial help from feed manu-
facturers and dealers,83 broiler growers enlarged their operations to take
BROILER INDUSTRY 13-14 (1964). The hens' meat was dry and strongly flavored and the meat of
the cockerels was usually tough. Id. at 14. The modem broiler is readily distinguished from his
ancestor by taste, texture and size. It is an altogether different product.
70. Id. at 8. Chicken had always been eaten, of course, but the commercial broiler
industry as it is known today was nonexistent before the 1930's. Most chicken was consumed
by farmers from their barnyard flocks. Commerce in "live market" broilers was confined to the
spring and early summer months. Only frozen birds were available on a year round basis.
Fresh, ice packed (non-frozen) broilers were not marketed commercially. Id. at 8-9.
71. W. TERMOHLEN, J. KINGHORNE, E. WARREN & J. RADABAUGH, AN ECONOMIC SURVEY
OF THE COMMERCIAL BROILER INDUSTRY 8-9 (1936) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC SURVEY].
Barnyard flocks also produced surpluses that were marketed locally. Id. at 8. See also B. To1IN
& H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 8.
72. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 8-9.
73. Id. at 8-9, 15. Tobin and Arthur comment that "once broiler growing got started, it not
only discovered a waiting market but also created a new market that far outdistanced anyone's
estimate of preexisting latent demand." Id. at 15.
74. See id. at 26-27.
75. See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 71, at 7-10.
76. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 8.
77. Id. at 8, 15-16. Commercial broilers accounted for only three percent of the total
number of chickens raised in 1934-35.
78. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 4 table 1. Production increased from 97
million pounds in 1934 to 413 million pounds in 1940, a 426% increase in only 6 years.
79. PACKERS AND STOCKYARD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, P.&S.A.
No. 1, THE BROILER INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF STRUCTURE, PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS
1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC STUDY]. See also B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note
69, at 15-17.
80. V. BENSON & T. WITzIG, supra note 2, at 4 table I. Production jumped from 413
million pounds in 1940 to 1.1 billion pounds in 1945, a 268% increase.
81. B. ToBN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 17, 31-35.
82. ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 1; B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 18-
20.
83. The phenomenal growth of broiler production was largely stimulated by the credit
extended by large feed manufacturers and dealers to broiler growers and contractors. Equity
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advantage of economies of scale. The onset of mass domestic retailing by
supermarket chains boosted domestic consumption84 and substantial export
markets developed. 85 By 1954, the average American consumed approxi-
mately thirteen and one-half pounds of broiler chicken per year. In 1934, he
had consumed only eight ounces.1
6
During the 1930's and 1940's the various stages of broiler production,
primary breeding, hatching, feed milling, growing, processing and market-
ing, were usually performed by separate enterprises.87 The primary breeder
delivered hatching eggs to the hatchery. The hatchery produced broiler
chicks that were then sold to growers. Growers purchased feed from feed
manufacturers and raised the broiler chicks to maturity. Processors then
bought the grown-out broilers. After being slaughtered and dressed, the
ready-to-cook bird was marketed.88 Each stage was its own profit center.
89
The growth of consumer demand for broiler meat in the 1940's and the
financial risks associated with expansion signaled the end of the relative
independence of these production units. As broiler prices sagged and de-
clined, growth of any kind was threatened by a lack of enterprise capital. 90
Growers either lacked the financial resources to expand production them-
selves or were unwilling to risk these resources in the market. 91 Post-war
initiatives in broiler production and marketing came from feed manufactur-
ers and processors who appreciated the potential of the broiler industry and
who had the capital to make it work. 92 Unconventional financing provided
by feed manufacturers, processors and other integrators allowed growers to
expand the size and productivity of their operations without taking the risks
usually associated with expansion. 93 Credit, however, had its price. "Grow-
ing contracts" evolved that divested the grower of much of his indepen-
capital was not available to most growers, nor did they have ready access to capital markets.
Even if they had access, they often proved unwilling to assume the heavy price risks of
borrowing. The feed mills and dealers, however, took the gamble and contributed the financial
resources that eventually put broiler production on a "technologically advantageous scale."
ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at I; B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 20-24.
84. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 26-29.
85. Id. at 29-30.
86. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 4 table 1. By 1976, annual per capita
consumption had risen to 40.4 pounds. Id.
87. ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 1; E. Roy, supra note 12, at 116; B. TOBIN & H.
ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 35, 54.
88. ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 71, at 3-5.
89. See B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 35.
90. The use of credit in broiler production was not new. Production costs have always
been fairly leveraged. ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 71, at 4. Falling prices, however, caused
the grower to seek alternative means of financing. E. Roy, supra note 12, at 118.
91. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 21, 23.
92. ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 1.
93. Id.; B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 20-24.
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dence and managerial discretion. The use of growing contracts spread in the
late 1940's and the 1950's, and broiler growers accepted them as a means of
minimizing or sharing production and market risks. 94 By the mid-1970's,
ninety-nine percent of all commercial broilers produced domestically were
raised under grower contracts or by integrated firms themselves. 95 The
typical production operation became a single profit center, 96 with the broiler
integrator involved in all five of the formerly separate stages of pro-
duction. 97 In the 1930's and 1940's, growers assumed the risks associated
with the inp ut, commodity production and production adjuncts stages. They
had to purchase chicks, grow them and supply feed, medicine and vac-
cines. 98 Today, the integrator assumes these risks. A breakdown of the cost
of producing a flock of broilers substantiates the risk borne by the integrator
and the shrinking dominion of the grower. Around ninety percent of the cost
is shouldered directly by the integrator. 99 The remaining ten percent repre-
sents the grower's payment, all or most of which is, in most cases, guaran-
teed. 100
94. ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 71, at 1, 10-11, 22, 39-44.
95. See V. BENSON & T. WrTzio, supra note 2, at 11.
96: ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 1.
97. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 1-2; ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 6,7
fig. 2, 22; Bargaining at Work, Labor Problems, Commodity Marketing Experiences, 44 FARM-
ER COOPERATIVES, May 1977, at 12.
The 5 stages of production include: (1) Input of raw material and production resources
(The typical broiler integrator supplies all chicks, having made all decisions as to the number
and timing of hatchery egg placements and the breed or type of broiler to be produced); (2)
commodity production (A portion of the actual raising of broiler chicks to maturity is contract-
ed out to broiler growers. The growers house and care for the birds as they grow to marketable
size, providing broiler houses, heaters, feeders, waterers, heating fuel, electricity and labor.
The integrator, however, supervises the growers' activities, either indirectly by contract or
directly through field supervisors); (3) production adjuncts (The integrator supplies broiler feed
and makes decisions concerning diet and type of feed. The integrator also provides medicines,
vaccines, health supplies and veterinary services); (4) handling and processing (The integrator
determines the age and size at which the birds are to be marketed. With the growers' help, the
integrator catches, coops, loads and transports the live broilers to his processing plant for
slaughter, dressing and grading); and (5) marketing and distribution (The dressed birds are
marketed according to age, weight and type to a variety of customers, including retail chain
stores, fast food outlets, institutional consumers, wholesalers and further processors. Some
integrators do their own shipping although most contract it out).
98. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
99. See V. BENSON & T. WrrzIG, supra note 2, at 8; E. ROY, supra note 12, at 138 table 4-
1. See also Letter from George B. Rogers, Program Leader, Poultry, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to Charles S. Stark, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice 4 (May 9, 1975) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review),
reprinted in Joint Appendix for Appellant and Appellee filed with Fifth Circuit 474 [hereinafter
cited as Rogers].




The positive effects on production of vertical integration have been
impressive: output climbed to 12.5 billion pounds in 1976,101 and gross
farm income from broiler production was over $2.9 billion.'0 2 The greatest
success of vertical integration, however, has been its achievements in
efficiency.t10 Efficiency of production has kept prices low despite increas-
ing feed'04 and energy 05 costs. Adjusted for inflation, broiler prices are
much lower today than they were in 1934.1°
The farm-retail spread, often called the marketing margin or marketing
charge, 107 is the difference between the retail price and the farm value of a
commodity. 10 Vertical integration should, if truly more efficient, hold
down the spread between retail price and farm value because of cost
efficiency in the delivered product and the elimination of middlemen. 109 The
spread between the farm value and retail price of broilers was 20.6 cents in
1953.110 By 1975, the marketing margin had widened to 28.6 cents,111 but
this represented only a 39% increase in the spread over the 22 year period.
This is remarkable compared to the aggregate widening of the margin
experienced by agriculture as a whole, which amounted to 107% over the
same period.
112
The relative amounts and costs of production inputs and adjuncts is
another means of gauging the broiler industry's production efficiency. The
101. V. BENSON & T. WrrzIG, supra note 2, at 4 table 1.
102. Id.
103. See F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 8.
104. W. CATHCART & G. RECTOR, POULTRY AND EGG SITUATION 22 table 18 (Economic
Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, PES-293, Mar. 1977); id. at 21 table 14 (PES-287,
Sept. 1975). See also ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, POULTRY
AND EGG STATISTICS, SUPPLEMENT FOR 1972-75 TO STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 525, at 32-33
tables 58-60 [hereinafter cited as STATISTICS (SuPp.)].
105. ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 449 table 724, 596 table 994.
106. See ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 15, 23. See also note 4 supra.
107. F. ScoTT & H. BADGER, FARM-RETAIL SPREADS FOR FOOD PRODUCTS 7 (Economic
Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 741, 1972).
108. Id.
109. It is nonetheless difficult to gauge the beneficial impact of vertical integration on the
delivered price. The spread may actually increase despite exceptional efficiencies in the
production area because the determination of the retail price is out of the producer's hands. The
retailer is the decisionmaker. Generally, however, cost efficiency attributable to vertical
integration should make the retail spread smaller for the commodity produced through vertical
integration than for commodities not produced through vertical integration.
110. F. SCOTr & H. BADGER, supra note 107, at 54.
111. W. CATHCART & G. RECTOR, supra note 104, at 26 table 22.
112. ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 650 table 1100; F. SCOTT & H. BADGER, supra note 107, at
3 table 1. See also F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 31-33 fig. 5 & table 16. The superior
performance of the broiler industry has been attributed to "economies of scale, automation and
other gains in marketing efficiencies." F. ScoTT & H. BADGER, supra at 54. See also E. RoY,
supra note 12, at 112-15.
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most expensive components of a broiler production system are feed, broiler
chicks and labor. Together, these elements comprise almost ninety-four
percent of the total cost of producing a broiler.1 3 Vertical integration has
optimized the per unit cost of each of these inputs. Improved feed formula-
tions have reduced the amount of feed required to produce one pound of live
broiler from 4 pounds in 1940 to 2.1 pounds today." 14 Integrators have cut
back chick costs by improving their survival rate. 5 The labor component
has also been drastically reduced. In 1940, it took 250 man-hours to produce
1,000 broilers.116 In 1969, the same amount of broilers could be produced
by only 15 man-hours. 117 The overall productivity of the poultry industry, of
which broilers comprise a substantial part, 118 increased almost 1200% be-
tween 1940 and 1969.119 For agriculture as a whole, it was only 700%.
120
Vertical integration has served the broiler industry well. The coordina-
tion of the various stages of production has produced a technologically
advanced and cost efficient system. 121 Performance, however, must also be
measured in horizontal terms.
3. Horizontal Performance
The vertical achievements of the broiler industry have not prevented it
from suffering from chronic price instability. The weak links in the indus-
try's vertical chain have always been over-production
122 and marketing. 123
113. F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 8. See also E. Roy, supra note 12, at 138 table
4-1. Roy estimates that these three components make up 88% of the cost of production.
114. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 7-8.
115. In 1949, the chick mortality rate was around 10-20% of the flock. Id. at 8. By 1972-74,
this mortality rate had been dropped to an average of 4.27% for broiler operations in the
southern and northeastern regions. Rogers, supra note 99, at 4, reprinted in Joint Appendix at
474 (derived). For southern operations alone, the rate was even lower: 3.26%. Id.
116. F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 8.
117. Id. This means that it took only 6% as much labor in 1969 to produce the same quantity
of broilers as in 1940. This far surpasses the national average of 30% as much labor in 1969 to
produce the same results as in 1940. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICUL-
TURE, STAT. BULL. No. 561, CHANGES IN FARM PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY 31 table 32 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CHANGES IN FARM PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY].
118. Seventy-six percent of all major poultry (including broilers, non-broiler chicken and
turkeys, but excluding eggs), measured by gross farm income, STATISTICS (SuIPp.), supra note
104, at 11 table 19, and 76.5% of all major poultry, measured by pounds produced, id. table 16-
18 (derived), were represented by broilers in 1975.
119. CHANGES IN FARM PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 117, at 44 table 45.
120. Id. The efficiency achieved in production inputs and adjuncts has been extended to
efficiencies in handling, processing and marketing as well. F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1,
at 19.
121. V. BENSON & T. WrrziG, supra note 2, at 1; ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 15,
23; E. Roy, supra note 12 at 112-15.
122. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 55-58.
123. "There can be little doubt that price instability is excessive in the broiler busi-
ness. . . . [The market may put a solvent and efficient [producer] in jeopardy." Id. at 91.
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To a large degree, these problems have resulted from the broiler industry's
failure to develop horizontally. 1
24
The industry has had a history of violent price swings,'25 years of
losses 126 and years of only marginal profitability. 127 This instability is
attributable to the production process, to the nature of the product itself and
to the structure of the market into which the product is sold. Broiler
production is typical of agricultural production generally in that production
decisions are made far in advance. The production cycle is continuous and
takes a minimum of 280 days to complete.128 The market existing at the time
the production decision is made or the time the production adjustments are
ordered may change significantly by the time the broilers are ready for
market. 129 Once the production commitments are made, they cannot be
reversed without the loss of investment.
The market itself is highly unpredictable. Because of its sensitivity to
such mutually independent stimuli as weather, 130 retail activity, 131 the sup-
124. It is . . . unfortunate that this spectacular [efficiency] achievement within the
broiler chicken industry did not result in better profits for a longer period of time than
it did. Technology and growth came so fast and so thoroughly that they gave impetus
to expansion, without, at the same time, giving any one grower or contractor any
degree of control over the market.
E. Roy, supra note 12, at 112.
125. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 91.
126. For example, net losses were suffered in 1970, 1971 and 1974. V. BENSON & T.
WITZIG, supra note 2, at 7 table 4.
127. 1972 was a breakeven year. 1968 and 1976 exhibited only marginal profitability. Id. See
also ECONOMIC STUDY, supra note 79, at 16 table 12.
128. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 48. It takes a minimum of 280 days to
produce one broiler, beginning with the decision to place primary setting eggs for the hatching
of the chicks that will become the hatchery supply flock. Once the hatching egg is produced, it
can be incubated and the broiler chick hatched, graded, debeaked and vaccinated in 24 days. It
takes approximately 60 days to grow a broiler. A dressed broiler is thus the product of
approximately 280 days' worth of planning. Since a typical laying period for the hatchery
supply flock is 245 days, the length of the entire cycle runs 525 days.
129. Tobin and Arthur downgrade the forward planning risk of broiler production. They
compare the production cycles of beef (27-30 months) and pork (10 months) and conclude that
"[t]here has been a tendency perhaps to focus too intently on the production cycles in the
broiler industry in the sense that the period of time, in and of itself, presented a peculiar
difficulty." Id. at 47-48. The relationship between forward planning and time is accentuated in
broiler production because of the perishability of the crop. Inventories of live broilers cannot be
accumulated for substantial periods of time. Not only do feed costs rise the longer the broilers
are fed, the heavier the birds become the less valuable they are. Broilers command premium
prices for relatively narrow weight ranges. Furthermore, the limited shelf-life of the broiler
after slaughter (7 days) puts pressure on the producer to market his birds. He cannot wait for
the market to come around. Broilers, of course, can be frozen, but there is a limit to freezer
capacity. Futhermore, when broilers are frozen instead of chilled, their value decreases.
Interplay between market demand and forward planning cannot be underestimated.
130. W. CATHCART & G. RECTOR, supra note 104, at 12-13; B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra
note 69, at 45-46.
131. See E. Roy, supra note 12, at 114; B. ToBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 114-16.
See also CONSUMER & MARKETING SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, PMG-6, 1969
BROILER MARKETING GUIDE 3 (May 1969) [hereinafter cited as BROILER MARKETING GUIDE].
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ply of competing protein sources such as beef and pork132 and the time of
year, 133 the market can experience dramatic changes weekly or even dai-
ly. 134 Under such circumstances, the coordination of production with market
demand has been largely a hit and miss proposition.
The nature of the broiler itself exacerbates the problem. A broiler's
"shelf-life" is limited. 135 Because processed broilers are chilled rather than
frozen, 136 they must be sold to the consumer within seven days after being
slaughtered. 137 This means that the producer must sell his product within a
maximum of four days from the date of slaughter, 138 and the exigencies of
time often throw the producer on the mercy of the market. He cannot hold
out for higher prices. The slogan in the trade is "sell 'em or smell 'em."
Finally, the market for broilers is oligopsonistic, dominated by large
retail chains such as A & P, Kroger and Safeway 139 and institutional food
outlets such as Kentucky Fried Chicken. 140 Because of their size, their
132. 1970 (2d quarter) BROILER MARKETING GUIDE, supra note 131, PMG-9, at 3-4 (Jan.
1970); 1969 id., PMG-6, at 3, 6 (May 1969); F. FABER & R. IRVIN, supra note 1, at 42-43. For
elasticity of demand coefficients, see V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 45, 46 table 32.
133. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at 18, table 26,37; W. CATHCART & G. RECTOR,
supra note 104, at 36-37 table 23.
134. This fact can be substantiated by reviewing any of the daily or weekly market reports
in circulation such as the United States Department of Agriculture Market News Service (the
"nine city weighted average price"), the Georgia, Alabama or Mississippi "dock" quotations,
or the Georgia "live" market quotations.
135. V. BENSON & T. WITIG, supra note 2, at 42-43.
136. Id. at 42; see note 129 supra.
137. V. BENSON & T. WIrzIG, supra note 2, at 43.
138. The four day deadline is a rule of thumb. Time must be allowed for loading, shipping,
unloading, stocking, and sale to the consumer. The time lapse in marketing varies according to
the distance of the market and the customer. See id. at 40.
139. Concentration in the food retailing industry has increased and the trend shows no sign
of abating. B. MARION, W. MUELLER, R. COTTERILL, F. DEITHMAN & J. SCHMELZER, THE
PROFIT AND PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LEADING FOOD CHAINS 1970-74-A STUDY FOR THE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 95TH CONG., lST SESS. 15 (1977). Retail chains (11 or more stores) have
increased their share of sales from 34% in 1948 to 57% in 1972. Id. at 9. The 20 largest chains
now represent 37% of all sales nationally. Id. at 11. Concentration is particularly noticeable in
urban markets, where the largest 4 retailers held an average of 52% of the market. Id. at I.
"Increasing concentration of purchasers restricts the alternatives open to suppliers, stimulates
compensating concentration on their part, and weakens the effectiveness of competition as a
self-regulating device throughout the industry." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FOOD MARKETING,
FOOD FROM FARMER TO CONSUMER 106 (1966) [hereinafter cited as FARMER TO CONSUMER].
Given the structure of the retail grocery market, it is significant that it is the most important
conduit for broilers to the consumer.
In 1975, 66% of the national broiler production was sold to retail food stores. A significant
portion of the retail trade was with supermarket chains. Sixty percent of the sales were direct;
40% went through wholesalers and other middlemen. V. BENSON & T. WITZIG, supra note 2, at
33, 35 fig. 4, 37.
140. Institutional purchasers have become an increasingly important market for broiler
production, largely because of the development and growth of fast food chains. Twenty-five
percent of all broilers produced go to institutions such as fast food outlets, restaurants and
schools. Sixty-four percent of this volume is sold directly by the producer to the customer; 36%
is sold through wholesalers. V. BENSON & T. WrrzIG, supra note 2, at 35 fig. 4.
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bargaining power and their ability to control demand through retail special-
ing activities, these buyers make the market for broilers. 141 Once a producer
commits to production, he is stuck with his output. If a major retailer refuses
to purchase except at a price below production cost, the producer has to take
the price. 142 The perishability of the product restricts his latitude in bargain-
ing. This pattern of below-cost buying occurred with increasing frequency
in the early 1970's.143
The market problems of the broiler industry are due largely to a lack of
horizontal power and coordination in the market. While achieving a remark-
able degree of vertical efficiency, the industry failed to come to terms with
the necessity for horizontal action. 144 The deteriorating price situation be-
came so serious in the late 1960's that the necessity for some kind of
horizontal solution was perceived. As a direct response to the problem,
NBMA was formed to bulwark the industry's vertical efficiencies with a
greater degree of horizontal control.
The foregoing analytical appraisal of the broiler industry's performance
in the horizontal and vertical dimensions is representative of developments
in other commodity groups. 14 5 In general, the participation of off-farm
integrators in agricultural production through vertical integration has pro-
duced positive and beneficial results. 146 New technology has been in-
141. Vertical integration has not subdued the importance of the wholesaling middlemen.
The number of broilers marketed directly in 1960 is approximately the same today (about 50%).
During the 1960's, the number marketed through wholesalers declined significantly, but the
trend toward direct marketing waned in the 1970's. Id. at 33, 35 fig. 4. The precise amount of
direct distribution, however, is unknown because processor owned or controlled "wholesal-
ers" are not broken out of the general wholesaler category.
142. The producer is not only forced to sell processed birds because of their limited shelf-
life, see text accompanying note 135 supra, he cannot hold back the broilers he has in the grow-
out stage, see note 129 supra.
143. 'During the 39 month period covered by the Government's Complaint, January 1970
through March 1973, net returns to broiler integrators on an aggregate basis were negative 21
months and positive for 18 months. The average losses were 1.69 cents per pound per month;
the average positive return was only 1.02 cents per month. Rogers, supra note 99, at 6, reprinted
in Joint Appendix at 476.
144. The initial response to market problems was to move the decisionmaking and risk-
taking roles from the input area (feed mills and hatcheries) to the processing area. The major
integrators today are processors. They are closer to the ultimate market and stand in a better
position to judge demand and adjust supply. See E. Roy, supra note 12, at 114-15; B. TOBIN &
H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 63.
145. See E. Roy, supra note 12, at 12; text accompanying note 65 supra.
146. For studies of the achievements or the potential of vertical integration in other
commodities, see W. GALLIMORE & R. IRVIN, THE TURKEY INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, PRACTICES,
AND COSTS (Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Marketing Research
Report No. 1000, 1973); J. HAAS, VIABILITY OF A COOPERATIVELY COORDINATED EGG COMPLEX
(Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Marketing Research Report No. 1055,
1975); J. HASKELL, A PRODUCER-BASED COTrON MARKETING SYSTEM (Farmer Cooperative
Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Marketing Research Report No. 1016, 1973); D. ROGERS,
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION IN THE MARKET EGG INDUSTRY 1955-69 (Economic
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troduced, production expanded, economic alternatives brought to depressed
areas, competition in the producing sector enhanced and products delivered
to the consumer at a low cost. Judged purely from a performance standpoint,
the participation of off-farm integrators in agriculture appears desirable.
The very success of off-farm integrators has precipitated controversy.
The competitive equality (if not superiority) of off-farm integrators has put
them on a collision course with on-farm producers.147 While the perform-
ance of the off-farm integrators has been statistically beneficial, the ultimate
evaluation cannot be divorced from political questions. Many view agricul-
ture as the exclusive province of the family farmer and fear that the so called
"corporate takeover" of farming will result in oligopolistic or monopolistic
control of the nation's food supply and the subjugation of the "rugged
individual tiller of the soil." To many, vertical integration is the means by
which this coup d'agriculture will occur. The fact that these off-farm
integrators also want to take advantage of horizontal benefits of cooperation
is almost too much for the family farmer to endure.148 The Chicken Case
presents this explosive combination of economic realities and political
tensions to the federal judiciary for evaluation in light of the antitrust laws.
II. NBMA AND THE SHERMAN ACT
NBMA was formed at a time when the industry was suffering from
serious economic depression. For several months, integrators experienced
negative net returns because market prices had dropped below production
costs. 149 Many of the industry's members believed that one way to amelio-
rate the hard times would be to develop and exchange reliable market
information through a cooperative association of broiler producers. While
they could have resorted to federally enforced broiler marketing orders as an
Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, ERS 477, 1971); C. WARD, INTEGRATED CATTLE
MARKETING-A BETrER WAY (Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, F.C.S.
Information 107, 1977). See also E. Roy, supra note 12, at 264-65, 327-30, 379-80, 424-25.
147. "'Integration and coordination will increase. The concern of farmers is, who will
control it?'" W. BARR, WHO WILL CONTROL U. S. AGRICULTURE-SITUATION AND ALTERNA-
TIVES 5 (Ohio State Univ., Dep't of Agricultural Economics, ESM 490, 1973). See also
Knutson, Cooperative Strategies in Imperfectly Competitive Market Structures-A Policy Per-
spective, 56 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 904, 906 (1974).
148. Yet the family farmer is suspect, too. There are some who find no solace in the
growing power of farmer-run cooperatives, and who charge that the oligopolies and monop-
olies feared of corporations are already realities in the hands of family farmers themselves. See
authorities cited note 252 infra.
149. 1967 and 1970 were especially hard years for the broiler industry. From January
through December of 1967, net returns to broiler producers were negative. For the period April
1970 through March 1971, returns were negative. Rogers, supra note 99, at 6 reprinted in Joint
Appendix at 476. See also V. BENSON & T. WrrZIG, supra note 2, at 7 table 4.
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alternative, 150 the founders of NBMA evidently preferred a cooperative
solution. Cooperation would give them a means of coming to grips with the
problems of the marketplace that at the same time would preserve the
entrepreneurial independence of the individual producer. Accordingly,
NBMA was organized and chartered in September of 1970 under the
authority of the Georgia Cooperative Marketing Act.15' Thereafter, accord-
ing to the government, "[the members of the cooperative routinely
exchange[d] price information and attempt[ed], in other ways, to ensure a
market at stable prices for their products."1 5 2 The Justice Department has
alleged that these activities' 53 violated section one of the Sherman Act
because NBMA did not qualify as a Capper-Volstead cooperative.
154
At the time of NBMA's formation, there were no indications that
integrated producers could not avail themselves of the benefits of the
Capper-Volstead Act155 and the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926.156 In
fact, signals from the Justice Department had been encouraging. In Novem-
ber of 1969, the Justice Department issued a business review letter to the
National Egg Company, a Capper-Volstead cooperative, which advised that
the Ralston-Purina Company could join the cooperative without causing it to
forfeit its exempt status. 157 Under the Justice Department's then prevailing
150. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (1970), authorizes the Secretary
of Agriculture, upon request and with approval of the industry, and upon a showing of specified
circumstances, to implement and enforce production and price controls. The Department of
Agriculture had investigated the feasibility of marketing orders for broiler production in the
early 1960's. When, however, a specific approach could not be agreed upon, the investigating
commission, the Broiler Stabilization Advisory Committee, disbanded. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR,
supra note 69, at 91-93. Producers of broilers and other commodities such as turkeys and wheat
resisted the lure of marketing orders. B. TOBIN & H. ARTHUR, supra note 69, at 92-93.
151. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 65-201 to -231 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
152. Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari 2.
153. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. In particular, the Justice Department
alleged that NBMA, in violation of § I of the Sherman Act, tried
(a) to exchange information about past, present, and future prices for broilers;
(b) to establish and disseminate a price for broilers;
(c) to sell broilers at or above that price;
(d) to report to NBMA surplus broilers that cannot be sold at that price;
(e) to sell undergrades at agreed on discounts from the Grade A price;
(f) to withhold broiler parts from the market in order to increase their price;
(g) to exchange information about past, present, and future production of
broilers;
(h) to sell surplus broilers to customers in foreign countries.
Amended Government Complaint 9.
154. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 152, at 1-2.
155. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1970).
156. Id. § 455.
157. Business Review Letter Re: "National Egg Company-Request for Business Re-
view" from Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
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view, the bearing of the risk of loss of the agricultural product distinguished
farmers from nonfarmers for the purpose of determining the availability of
exemptions from the antitrust laws.158 Because of the favorable climate,
NBMA organized without requesting a business review letter of its own.
In the late fall of 1970, Holly Farms Poultry Industries, Inc., a North
Carolina broiler producer, decided to join NBMA. Desiring to chart its
course carefully in order to avoid violation of the antitrust laws, Holly
Farms requested a business review letter with regard to its proposed affilia-
tion with NBMA. 159 A year later the Justice Department answered the
inquiry by reversing its previous interpretation of the law. 160 It advised
Holly Farms that the antitrust immunity of Capper-Volstead does not extend
to agricultural production by integrated producers using contract growers. '61
The Department also issued a second letter to the National Egg Company
Irving Isaacson, Esq., att'y for National Egg Company (Nov. 24, 1969) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review). "[I]t is our opinion that Ralston-Purina is 'engaged in the
production of agricultural products."' Id. National Egg Company wanted assurance that
Ralston-Purina, an integrated producer, would not be considered a "non-producer" whose
membership would disqualify the cooperative from Capper-Volstead protection. See Case-
Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967). Ralston-Purina was engaged in egg
production and, like broiler integrators, used contract growers.
158. As originally formulated and enunciated, the Justice Deparment's test would have
made anyone who bears a substantial part of the risk of loss of the agricultural "crop" eligible
for membership in an exempt cooperative. This test was outlined by Charles D. Mahaffie, Jr.,
then Chief of the Trial Section, Antitrust Division, in an address before the Springfield Bank for
Cooperatives in 1971:
One of the things that sets farmers apart from other businessmen is the fact that "their
economic fate was in large measure dependent upon contingencies beyond their
control." This is the risk of loss of a crop. If drought or hail wipes out a crop, or if
animals become diseased ahd die, a farmer will lose the fruits of his investment in
land, buildings and equipment and he will lose the fruits of his own labor for an entire
growing season. . . .In my view one who does not bear this risk, or at least a
substantial part of it, is not a farmer and is not entitled to the benefits of the
a ricltural exemption from the antitrust laws.
Address b .-Mahaffie, Jr., Chief, Trial Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Springfield Bank r Cooperatives, Cherry Hill, N.J., 15-16 (Aug. 18, 1971) (quoting Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 4 (1940)) (emphasis added) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review). Mr. Mahaffie's comments indicate that the Justice Department then assumed that the
loss of the crop would trigger the loss of investment in land, buildings, and equipment.
159. Application for Business Review (Nov. 25, 1970) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
160. Business Review Letter Re: "Holly Farms Poultry Industries, Inc.-Request for
Business Review" from Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William H. McElwee, Esq., att'y for Holly Farms Poultry Industries, Inc. (Nov. 17,
1971) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Reveiw).
161. [lit appears that more than 97% of the broilers that Holly Farms deals in are
produced on farms neither owned nor operated by Holly Farms, in accordance with
agreements that leave a substantial part of the risk connected with the production of
the broilers on the owners of the farms. We do not consider this part of Holly Farms'
broiler handling to qualify it as a person "engaged in the production of agricultural
products as [a farmer]".
Id. at 1-2.
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rescinding its previous ruling. 162 The Justice Department's action signaled a
shift from its definition of "farmer" as one who bears the risk of loss of the
product to one who bears the risk of loss of his investment in "land,
buildings and equipment.'
63
Seeking an authoritative decision on the exemption issue, NBMA and
Holly Farms filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act 14 for a
declaratory judgment. 165 Meanwhile, the Justice Department took the offen-
sive by bringing an antitrust action against NBMA in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 166 Upon the Justice
Department's motion, the declaratory judgment action was dismissed 67 and
the parties squared off in the Georgia forum.
The district court, adopting the risk of loss of product test, found that
NBMA's integrator-members were sufficiently involved in the production
of broilers from a risk standpoint "to justify their classification as '[plersons
engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers. . . ' within
the meaning of the Capper-Volstead Act and to permit their claim to the
antitrust exemption to the extent permitted by that statute."' 168 The Justice
162. Business Review Letter Re: "Reexamination of National Egg Company Business
Review" from Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Irving Isaacson, Esq., att'y for National Egg Co. (Nov. 17, 1971) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
163. Address by C. Mahaffie, Jr., Chief, Trial Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Legal Tax and Accounting Comm. of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives,
Phoenix, Ariz. 8 (Jan. 11, 1972) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). The
Justice Department noted that Holly Farms did not "assume substantially all the risk typically
inherent in the role of a farmer," and placed special emphasis on ownership of a farm and
buildings. The rationale (although not the result) has been criticized by a Department of
Agriculture official:
The conclusion that Holly Farms does not bear substantially all the risk is an
interesting one since Holly Farms held title to the fowl, supplied all feed and certain
management inputs, and paid producers on the basis of a minimum price per bird
delivered with an escalator if the market price was above specific levels. The farmer
essentially was paid a piece wage which depended upon the number of birds delivered.
His most significant risk was that of disease and other natural disasters which could
result in bird losses. If Justice came to the right conclusion, it appears to have done it
for the wrong reason.
Food Price Investigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15,528 n.23 (1973) (paper by R.
Knutson, Staff Economist, Agricultural Marketing Service entitled "Antitrust Application to
Contemporary Food Production and Marketing Issues") [hereinafter cited as Food Price
Investigation].
164. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
165. Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc. v. Kleindienst, Civil Action No. C-151-W-72
(M.D.N.C., filed -, 1972).
166. United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n, Civil Action No. 18173 (N.D. Ga.,
filed April 16, 1973).
167. Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc. v. Kleindienst, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,534
(M.D.N.C. 1973) (Ward, J.).
168. United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,509, at
67,223. The parties stipulated the facts and judgment was rendered granting NBMA's motion
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Department appealed the district court decision to the Fifth Circuit and won
a reversal 169 on the ground that "Congress clearly meant to limit the benefits
of the Capper-Volstead Act to persons who own or operate farms." 170 The
final determination is now in the hands of the Supreme Court, which granted
NBMA's certiorari petition.171 The Court will have the opportunity to
resolve the three basic issues underlying the Chicken Case, each of which is
analyzed in the following material.
A. Participation and Competition of Off-Farm Integrators in the
Production, Processing and Marketing of Agricultural Commodities
Before attempting to determine whether off-farm integrators should be
allowed to take advantage of the benefits of Capper-Volstead cooperation, it
is first necessary to determine whether off-farm integrators should be in-
volved in agriculture at all. Family farmers'72 and their friends have been
fairly successful in advertising the spectre of the "corporate takeover" of
farming, 173 and have advanced numerous reasons why "corporate conglom-
erates" should be barred entirely from agricultural production.
Those opposed to the participation of "agribusiness" argue that the
family farmer is a more efficient laborer than is the corporate absentee
landlord and that the farmer can reach a profitable economy of scale at a
reasonable size. 174 Family farmers also point up the dangers of monopoly in
for partial sumruary judgment and denying the Justice Department's cross-motions for partial
summary judgment.
169. 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977).
170. Id. at 1386.
171. 98 S. Ct. 260 (1977) (No. 77-117).
172. Precisely who is a "family farmer" is often disputed. The historical meaning of the
term envisions a farm owned or managed by an individual (or family) who also provides all or a
substantial part of the labor necessary to operate the farm. Other candidates for family farm
status include tenant farmers, who work their farms but do not own them, and large-scale
farming operations in which the family labor contribution is more than 50%. See Family Farm
Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 53-55 (statement of Professor Richard D. Rodefeld), 119
(statement of Ben. H. Radcliffe, Executive Committee Member, National Farmers Union),
163 (statement of John W. Scott, Master of the National Grange) for classification schemes.
173. In the 1960's and early 1970's a number of large corporations, many of them conglom-
erates, bought their way into food production. Some of these corporations included: Tenneco
(vegetables); Ralston-Purina (broilers); Pillsbury (broilers); ITT (pork products); Gates Rubber
(sugar beets); and Ling-Temco-Vought (turkeys). One observer was moved to comment:
"Sunday dinner just isn't what it used to be: the turkey is from Greyhound and the ham is from
ITT; the fresh vegetable salad is from Tenneco, with lettuce from Dow-Chemical; potatoes by
Boeing are placed alongside a roast from John Hancock Mutual Life; and there are afterdinner
almonds from Getty Oil." Food Price Investigation, supra note 163, at 357 (testimony of James
Hightower, Director, Agribusiness Accountability Project). The involvement of these firms in
food production precipitated an outcry from their real and potential competitors, many of
whom are "family farmers." The family farmer lobby gave the public the impression that their
situation was desperate. ("Corporate America surrounds the independent family farmers." Id.
at 362).
174. Id. at 361-62; Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 15 (statement of Represen-
tative James Abourezk).
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the food production area. 17 5 They theorize that the elimination and replace-
ment of hundreds of thousands of small farmers by a few agribusiness giants
will unduly concentrate market power to the ultimate disadvantage of the
consumer. 176 From a sociological standpoint, family farm proponents have
identified a "social need to keep people on the land.' 177 Finally, in step
with the times, family farmers claim to be better conservationists than
"absentee conglomerate landlords" who commit "environmental rape of
vast areas of the countryside."
1 78
After cutting through the rhetoric, it becomes apparent that the opposi-
tion to agribusiness involvement in agriculture is based on the small farm-
er's real fear that he will be unable to compete. Family farmers feel
particularly threatened by the ability of vertically integrated organizations to
"farm at a lkss" and use profits from other activities, such as processing
and retailing, to subsidize or recoup their losses. This practice would
provide vertically integrated agribusiness with competitive advantages in the
production of commodities without any real regard to the efficiency of
production. The vertically integrated firm could be less efficient than the
family farmer at the production level, incur losses, but use earnings from
other stages of production to offset these losses. 
179
The fears of family farmers have been translated into political action in
several states. North Dakota, for example, generally"8 prohibits any kind of
corporate involvement in agricultural production. 181 Six other states sub-
stantially restrict the activities of certain corporations in farming. 182 On the
national level, there have been unsuccessful attempts to proscribe involve-
175. Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 91 (statement of Representative Arthur
A. Link); 134 (statement of Harold F. Breimyer, Professor and Extension Economist, Univer-
sity of Missouri).
176. Id. at 15 (statement of Representative James Abourezk). See also Knutson, Definition
of Producer is Critical Policy Issue, 41 NEWS FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES, Aug. 1974, at 17.
177. Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 15; accord, id. at 92 (statement of
Representative Arthur A. Link), 119 (statement of Ben H. Radcliffe, Executive Committee
Member, National Farmers Union), 121-24 (statement of John A. Wilson, Legislative Director,
National Sharecroppers Fund).
178. Id. at 16 (statement of Representative James Abourezk).
179. Id.
180. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-04 (1976) exempts "cooperative corporations," 75% of
whose members or shareholders are "actual farmers," from the prohibition. "Actual farmers"
are those who live on the land or earn their living principally from agriculture. Id.
181. Id. §§ 10-06-01 to -06. The constitutionality of this law has been upheld. Asbury Hosp.
v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945). See also North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Stores,
414 U.S. 156 (1973).
182. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.1 to.15 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78); KAN. STAT. §§ 17-5901,
-5902 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 350.010 to .030 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 951-954 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -23
(Supp. 1977); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 182.001 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
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ment in farming by large corporations through the adoption of a family farm
antitrust bill. 1
8 3
Aside from the seven states where anticorporate legislation is in effect,
and aside from periodic feints to get similar legislation through Congress,
there is no legal barrier to agribusiness participation in agricultural pro-
duction. There are, however, traces of a certain instinctive resistance to
"corporate farming" that has little basis or justification in economic reality.
This instinctive resistance surfaces in the Fifth Circuit opinion in the Chick-
en Case:
NBMA cautions us against a romantic view of agriculture and
points out that agriculture has changed greatly from the Jefferson-
ian conception of the self-sufficient yeoman. We agree that agricul-
ture has changed much. But the ordinary, popular meaning of the
word "farmer" has not. When the common run of people wish to
speak of the broader spectrum of modern agriculture, the word
generally used is "agribusiness." "Farmer" still means what it
meant in 1922-one who owns or operates a farm.184
The Fifth Circuit's parodoxical musings exhibit the frailties of romantic
conditioning. Even if the "ordinary, popular meaning" of farmer has not
changed since 1922, the ordinary, popular farmer definitely has. The dis-
tinction the Fifth Circuit attempts to draw between off-farm integrators and
on-farm producers today is functionally nonexistent in most instances.
The Fifth Circuit's acknowledgement that "agriculture has changed
much" is glib understatement. Agriculture and agriculturalists have under-
gone a tremendous transformation since 1922. Today's major farms are
larger, 185 more mechanized 18 6 and more technologically advanced 187 than
183. H.R. 11654, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 2-5; S.
840, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Family Farm Antitrust Act of 1977). The.most recent version of the
bill would make it an antitrust violation for enterprises whose nonfarming assets exceed $3
million to "engage, directly or indirectly, in farming or the production of agricultural prod-
ucts." Id. § 3(a). The bill has never been favorably reported out of committee. Extensive
hearings were held on H.R. 11654 and similar bills in March 1972. Comment from major
witnesses, including representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Justice, was not
favorable. See generally Family Farm Act Hearings, supra.
184. 550 F.2d at 1386.
185. The average farm in 1976 had 389 acres, compared with 151 acres in 1930. ABSTRACT,
supra note 4, at 632 table 1065. Farms with sales exceeding $40,0M per year constituted 16% of
all farms in 1975, but accounted for 67.5% of all gross farm income. Id. at 646 table 1093
(derived). The average acreage of these farms was 1,611 acres in 1969. Id. at 635 table 1071.
Farms in the $20,000-$39,999 bracket represented 20.1% of all farms and accounted for 19.2%
of all gross farm income in 1975. Id. at 646 table 1093. The average acreage of these farms in
1969 was 626 acres. Id. at 635 table 1071. Using the 1969 data base for acreage and the 1975 data
base for gross sales, it can be interpolated that 86.7% of gross farm income nationally is
attributable to production on farms that average around 1020 acres in size. Compare id. at 635
table 1071 (derived) with id. at 646 table 1093 (derived).
186. Despite a marked decline in the number of farms and farmers, the numbers and kinds
of farm machinery are far greater today than in the early 1920's. The number of tractors
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their turn-of-the-century counterparts. Farm management has become an
industrial science complete with its own regalia of input matrices, cost
curves and production margins.188 Cultivated land is likely to be leased,1 89
and investment capital for expansion is usually borrowed.190 A fair degree of
vertical integration has been achieved as well, either independently through
the use of futures markets and management or forecast advisory services, 191
or cooperatively through supply and marketing associations. 192 The farming
operations that have achieved these technological, managerial and financial
efficiencies now account for an estimated two-thirds of all farm production,
even though they comprise only sixteen percent of all farmers. 
193
increased from 246,000 in 1920 to 4,109,000 in 1976; farm motor trucks from 139,000 to
2,870,000; grain combines from 4,000 to 655,000; corn pickers from 10,000 to 585,000; and
pickup balors and field forage harvesters from none in 1920 to 574,000 and 280,000, respective-
ly, in 1976. CHANGES IN FARM PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY, supra note 117, at 29 table 30.
These statistics are representative only and do not reflect technical advances made in farming
equipment since the 1920's. Another measure of mechanization is the rise in productivity per
man-hour. Since 1920, the man-hour output of farm workers has increased 940%. Id. at 44 table
450. Measured in terms of input, use of farm labor has declined 76% while use of mechanical
power and machinery has increased 325%. Id. at 55-56 table 56.
187. "[C]hanges are reducing the number of workers required in agriculture, increasing the
efficient size for a farm, and transforming the farm into a business requiring skillful manage-
ment, high technical competence and large investment." FARMER TO CONSUMER, supra note
139, at 101.
188. See How the Family Farm Can Harvest Millions, Bus. WEEK, July 4, 1977, at 68;
Knutson, Family Farmers Can Earn Membership in Tomorrow's Industrialized Agriculture, 40
NEWS FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES, Feb. 1974, at 1, 4-5.
189. At present, almost 38% of all farmland is rented, either by active operators seeking
additional acreage (24.6%) or by tenant farmers (12.9%). See B. JOHNSON, FARMLAND TENURE
PATrERNS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 table I (Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Agricultural Economic Report No. 249, 1974). Because of rising real estate
values, leasing will become an increasingly prevalent means of financing farm operations. Id. at
35-37. See also ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 634 table 1068.
190. See ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 647 table 1094; ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AFS--2, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE STATISTICS (1974). See also How the
Family Farm Can Harvest Millions, supra note 188.
191. How the Family Farmer Can Harvest Millions, supra note 188. The use of manage-
ment and forecast advisory services, and resort to futures markets enables the producer to
coordinate its production with the demands of better-defined markets. While this activity does
not constitute vertical integration in the classic sense, it serves the same ends as vertical
integration: a closer coordination between production and post-production stages of the food
chain. See also A. PAUL, R. HEIFNER & J. HELMUTH, FARMERS' USE OF FORWARD CONTRACTS
AND FUTURES MARKETS (Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agriculture
Economic Report No. 320, 1976).
192. Integration through cooperative associations is the most prevalent form of producer-
based integration. Inputs and production adjuncts may be coordinated through supply coopera-
tives and the post-production stages may be handled by association-controlled processors,
transporters and marketers. See, e.g., Agfoods'Forward Distribution Smooths Marketing, Cuts
Costs, 42 NEWS FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES, July 1975, at 9; Better Coordination Could Net
Increased Produce Returns, 43 id., Nov. 1976, at 20; Cooperative Marketing Alternatives
Outlined for Florida Cattlemen, 44 FARMER COOPERATIVES, Apr. 1977, at 20; Cotton Producer
System Can Cut Costs $15a Bale, 41 NEWS FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES, Apr. 1974, at 11; Local
Cooperatives in Integrated Pest Management, 43 FARMER COOPERATIVES, Mar. 1977, at 17.
193. ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 646 table 1093.
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Simple indicators suggest that the economic characteristics of farming
and vertically integrated "agribusiness" are not as disparate as many people
assume. They are, in fact, functionally similar. While the direction from
which most investment and production incentives come may have been
changed, differences, if they exist, are likely to be matters of degree
94
rather than substance. For farming in the classical sense, the incentives
originate from individual producers and spread outward to input or post-
production stages. 195 For "agribusiness," the initatives originate off-farm in
the input or post-production stages and spread forward or backward into the
production area. 196 If the goals of modern agricultural enterprise are to
stabilize the economic viability of production units through closer coordina-
tion between all stages of input, production, processing and marketing, to
achieve optimum economies of scale and technical efficiency in production,
processing and distribution, and to deliver a wholesome product to the
consumer at the lowest possible price, then the law should be neutral as to
whether these goals are realized through the initiatives of on-farm or off-
farm firms. Unfortunately, the ingrained bias of "the common run of
people," as translated by the Fifth Circuit, causes resistance to the entry of
off-farm firms into agricultural production. Both the Department of Agricul-
ture and the Department of Justice, however, have opposed any attempt to
prevent off-farm firms from participating and competing in agricultural
production.
From the standpoint of production and marketing, the Department of
Agriculture has taken the position that "closer coordination between pro-
duction and marketing processes through contractual or integrated arrange-
ments has been beneficial to both producers and consumers by supplying
more uniform and higher quality food products than otherwise could have
been obtained at prevailing product prices." 197 The broiler industry is often
cited as an example of the achievements of a closely coordinated system. 1
98
From the standpoint of antitrust policy, the Justice Department has warned
194. For example, vertically integrated agribusiness is more likely to exercise a greater
degree of control over the various stages of production in which it is involved because decision-
making is centralized. Although the on-farm producer might achieve a degree of vertical
integration through self-help (futures markets, etc.) or cooperation, the vertical control is less
centralized and more subject to external influences. While the degrees of vertical coordination
may differ, the results will be roughly the same if efficient coordination is achieved.
195. The sugar beet and potato processing ventures discussed in the authorities cited in
notes 21 & 22 supra are examples of producer-originated initiatives toward vertical integration.
196. The success of the broiler industry exemplifies the result of initiatives taken by off-
farm integrators to integrate vertically into the broiler production stage.
197. Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 21 (testimony of J. Phil Campbell, Under
Secretary of Agriculture).
198. See id. at 21-22, 46-47.
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against restricting competition in agricultural production and limiting "the
ability of persons to choose the economic endeavors that they wish to
pursue."1 99 Nothing is inherently anticompetitive or illegal about vertical
integration or conglomerate organization. "In economic terms, vertical
integration may yield advantages in efficiencies and cost-savings, while a
conglomerate structure may be able to provide the heavy financing required
by a subsidiary in a capital intensive field.'2 The real anticompetitive
danger in agriculture is the threatened exclusion of off-farm firms from
competition.
20 1
The proponents of the family farm will undoubtedly continue to voice
their fears of the corporate invasion of the sanctimonium of agriculture.
Such diatribe is a ruse that bears little relation to reality. Off-farm firms have
entered into agricultural production. While some of the big boys have
withdrawn after suffering losses, 202 smaller firms remain and, through
various forms of vertical integration, are achieving goals that both the
Departments of Agriculture and Justice applaud as beneficial. 203 At the same
time, these off-farm firms are competing with large, vertically coordinated
on-farm enterprises that have posted respectable performance records of
their own. If the small family farmer's viability is in fact jeopardized, the
threat comes from the larger on-farm producers rather than from off-farm
firms. 204 Without the contract growing arrangements adopted by many off-
199. Id. at 78 (testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice).
200. Id.
201. [O]ur success has been based to a considerable extent on the ability of our farm
producers to achieve economies of scale through capital intensive technology rather
than labor intensive methods of farming.
Prohibiting companies with large nonfarm activities from engaging in agricultural
pursuits may eliminate from the market many of the companies which possess the
necessary financial resources to make full use of these technological developments.
Id. at 79.
202. Some of the large corporations and conglomerates that entered the field of agricultural
production, among them Ralston-Purina, Purex, Tenneco and Gates Rubber, found their
ventures unprofitable and withdrew or cut back substantially their investments. Id. at 29-30
(testimony of J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary of Agriculture).
203. Id. at 23, 28, 41, 49 (testimony of J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary of Agriculture),
79, 81 (testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
204. The competitive problem of the small family farmer lies in his disadvantaged
position as against the more efficient scale of operations of the large corporate farmer,
whether or not the latter is associated with a nonfarming firm. . . .[T]he majority of
corporate farming operations are conducted by firms wholly engaged in agriculture
and not affiliated with outside interests.
Thus, barring vertically integrated firms and conglomerates would still leave the
small farmer facing the same problems with the remaining corporate farmers.
Id. at 79 (testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
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farm integrators, the smaller farmer would have been eliminated years
ago. 2
05
The distinction between "agribusiness" and "farmer," therefore, is
not so clear as some would suggest. Whether the initiatives originate on-
farm or off-farm, the resulting enterprises tend to be large, technologically
progessive, managerially sophisticated and vertically integrated to some
degree. Despite the functional similarities, however, the Fifth Circuit auto-
matically categorized one as "farmer" and the other as "agribusiness."
The categorization is on the order of Mr. Lincoln's dog.
206
From a realistic point of view, nothing prevents "agribusiness" from
being a "farmer," or vice versa, since: each has taken on some of the
attributes of the other. Antitrust policy militates against the exclusion of off-
farm integrators from competition. 2 7 To do so would be anticompetitive
and adverse to the interests of the small farmer, many of whom benefit from
contract growing arrangements. Agribusiness firms should be allowed to
participate and compete in the production, processing and marketing of
agricultural commodities, and no legal disability should be imposed on them
through special and arbitrary distinctions attributable to their off-farm ori-
gins. The question remains whether off-farm integrators should also be
allowed to take advantage of the Capper-Volstead Act.
B. The Extension of Benefits of the Capper-Volstead Act
and Related Statutes to Off-Farm Integrators
The Fifth Circuit has defined "farmer" and "farming" narrowly, to
the exclusion of broiler integrators: "Whatever else farming may mean, an
irreducible minimum must be either husbandry of animals or crops or farm
ownership.' '208 " 'Farmer' still means what it did in 1922-one who owns
205. Id. at 21-22, 23, 49 (testimony of J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary of Agriculture).
206. "[W]hen they asked Mr. Lincoln how many legs the dog had, he said, 'Four.' They
asked him, 'If you called the tail a leg, how many legs does the dog have?' And he said 'four,
because calling a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg.'" Calling a vertically integrated production
system "agribusiness" doesn't necessarily make it a non-farmer. Apologies to Mr. Lincoln and
to Representative William L. Hungate of Missouri. See id. at 16 (statement of Representative
William Hungate).
207. The Department of Justice has traditionally opposed special exemptions from the
antitrust laws. It is equally opposed to special exemptions from the workings of the
competitive system underlying those laws. No sector of the economy should be
insulated from competitive forces unless particular circumstances clearly demonstrate
that competition cannot adequately regulate its conduct.
Id. at 77 (testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
208. 550 F.2d at 1386.
We cannot conceive that the ordinary, popular sense of the word "farmers" would fit
broiler integrator companies. The husbandry of the broiler flocks is carried out neither
by these firms nor by their employees, but by the contract growers. The farms where
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or operates a farm." 2 9 Under this interpretation of the law, off-farm inte-
grators who rely on contract growing arrangements must own or operate the
farm on which their agricultural products are produced in order to be
included within the Capper-Volstead meaning of "[plersons engaged in the
production of agricultural products as farmers." 210 The law, however, is not
made of such gossamer stuff as this.
Suppose all of NBMA's members, in response to the Fifth Circuit's
ruling, buy out or lease211 their growers' operations and contract for their
services on a wage basis. 212 Little has changed. The integrator still supplies
chicks, feed and medicine, makes all production decisions, supervises the
grow-out and controls his growers, but now the control is wage oriented
rather than contractual. Employment agreements, however, are also matters
of contract, and the wage rate can be raised or lowered, or the agreement
terminated. 213 The only tangible change is in the status of the grower. He is
a wage laborer instead of a quasi-independent grower. Perhaps the integrator
now has a greater investment in the buildings and land used for the grow-
out, which, however, represent only a fraction of the total production cost
(and investment risk) of raising broilers. 214 Yet this same integrator, because
he now owns or operates a farm, can legally join with other integrators to
form a Capper-Volstead cooperative. The Fifth Circuit test is a legal distinc-
tion without an actual economic implication. Why should such a nimble
shift of operational structure involving assets of economic (and competitive)
insignificance dictate a complete reversal of results for antitrust purposes?
The answer is that it should not.
Because the Fifth Circuit's test determines Capper-Volstead eligibility
without regard to the real economic risks of the farming enterprise, it is
the husbandry is done are not owned by NBMA members or their employees, but by
these growers.
Id. On the basis of stipulated facts, it is difficult to see how the Fifth Circuit came to the
conclusion that the integrators did not become involved in the "husbandry" of broiler flocks.
The integrators made all decisions with respect to egg placements and broiler chick hatchings.
Although integrators then delivered the chicks to the growers for raising, they at all times made
the decisions concerning diet, feed and growth.
209. Id.
210. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
211. Since the test is "owns or operates," presumably it is broad enough to include leasing.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that tenant farmers and sharecroppers are
considered "farmers" for Capper-Volstead purposes. See note 232 and text accompanying
notes 232-33 infra.
212. By making growers employees of the integrator, the entire grow-out stage falls under
the direct control of the integrator.
213. Since the integrator undoubtedly becomes an "agricultural producer" with respect to
the actual raising of the birds, he is exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage
requirements. Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
214. See V. BENSON & T. WrrzIG, supra note 2, at 4 table I.
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doubly unsatisfactory: it provides all integrators a means of obtaining
Capper-Volstead covierage without regard to the risks they may take in the
marketplace and it virtually assures the elimination of the contract grower
from the entrepreneurial class.
1. Who Is a "Person Engaged in the Production
of Agricultural Products"?
In formulating its test, the Fifth Circuit turned to the Capper-Volstead
Act's legislative history for guidance. Given the rhetoric of the times, the
legislative history is replete with references to "small holder[s] of land" 215
and "individual ownership and proprietorship of the soil." 216 The legisla-
tive history also abounds with anticorporate bias217 and clearly indicates that
processors and packers, whether they buy their supplies from farmers on the
open market or under contract, are not eligible for Capper-Volstead
privileges. 218 On the basis of such descriptive references, the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a Capper-Volstead "farmer" must own or operate a farm. The
analysis is deficient because it does not go far enough.
215. 62 CONG. REc. 2050 (1922) (remarks of Senator Kellogg).
216. Id. at 2051.
217. The anticorporate bias of the cooperative movement got an early start. At the debates
on § 6 of the Clayton Act, Representative Quin paid the following compliments to the world of
capitalism: "Can any man ... think of an organization of thieves equal to that gigantic
aggregation of capitalists who form the Beef Trust? Why is it that none of these men are
wearing stripes in the penitentary?" 51 id. at 9546 (1914). This anticorporate bias carried
through to the debates on the Capper-Volstead bill. See 62 id. at 2052, 2216 (remarks of Senator
Townsend), 2060, 2061 (remarks of Senator Capper), 2121, 2156-57 (remarks of Senator Walsh),
2257 (remarks of Senator Norris), 2262 (1922) (remarks of Senator Hitchcock).
218. Senator Phipps offered an amendment to the Capper-Volstead bill that would have
extended antitrust immunity to processors of agricultural products who had entered into pre-
planting contracts with farmers. 62 id. at 2273 (1922). After some pointed debate, id. at 2274,
the Senate rejected the proposed amendment. Id. at 2275. The chief fear of allowing the
amendment was expressed by Senator Kellogg:
[I]f they [the processors] make contracts with the producers of the raw materials,
the packers, the'sugair manufacturers, or'anybody manufacturing anything where the
raw product is produced on the farms can combine under this bill. If the Senate wishes
absolutely to defeat the bill, it ought to adopt this amendment; otherwise not.
Id. at 2274.
While the rejection of the proposed Phipps Amendment does indicate that Congress was
unwilling to extend the benefits of cooperation downstream to processors operating under
simple commodity supply agreements, it "does not reveal the intent of Congress concerning
those involved in the various stages of production in addition to manufacturing or who already
own the products and do not purchase from a farmer." 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,509, at 67,220-21
(Henderson J.). Even the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the differences between broiler contract-
ing and the practices described in the Phipps Amendment."[W]e concede that there are
differences between the contractual arrangement prevalent in the broiler industry and the
arrangements that would have been covered by the Phipps Amendment . . . ." 550 F.2d at
1389. The Fifth Circuit went on to rely on the Phipps debates anyway. Id. The only "irreducible
medium" the debates suggest is that the entity seeking Capper-Volstead privileges must
produce the product. See 62 CONG. REC. 2156-57 (1922) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
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Capper-Volstead's legislative history must be considered in the context
of the times that produced it. Modern forms of integrated commercial
production-broiler or otherwise-were unknown and unanticipated in
1922. It is difficult to divine congressional intent toward a form of agricul-
tural production that was not yet visibly in existence. The formidable
problem with interpreting and applying Capper-Volstead's legislative his-
tory, then, is its failure to address the operating forms that developed and
were adopted by producers subsequent to the Act's adoption. Technical
developments in farming have rendered much of the descriptive worth of the
debates obsolete. If Senator Kellogg were alive today, for example, he
would undoubtedly be embarrassed by his fearless declaration that "the
farmer can not consolidate his land into great holdings or into corporate
ownership . ... "219 Today, of course, vast consolidations in land own-
ership have occurred and corporate farms have come into existence.
220
Neither factor has precluded the farmers involved from becoming members
of cooperative associations. 221 If the Fifth Circuit is consistent in its reliance
on the descriptive worth of the legislative history, however, these large scale
and corporate farms must be excluded from the Act's coverage, even if they
are owned and operated by family groups.
Although the legislative history sheds little light on the meaning of
"producer" or "farmer,''222 it is instructive as to the fundamental policy
and purpose of the Act. The Fifth Circuit was preoccupied with descriptions
of the problems facing agriculture in 1922, rather than with a comprehensive
analysis of their causes. Its focus was wrong. The Act's intended scope
219. 62 CONG. REC. 2051 (1922).
220. With regard to consolidation of land holdings, see note 185 supra. In 1969, corporate
farms comprised .6% of the total number of farms but accounted for 15.3% of all business
receipts. G. COFFMAN, FARM CORPORATIONS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 2 table I (Economic
Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultural Economic Report No. 241, 1973).
221. Because of the anticapitalistic tone of the Capper-Volstead debates, and because of
the statements by some of Capper-Volstead's staunchest supporters ("I do not believe that the
word 'persons' here would include corporations," 62 CONG. REC. 2121 (1922) (remarks of
Senator Walsh)), it is arguable that corporations are disabled from participating in cooperative
associations. However, the language of the statute, as finally enacted, does not expressly
exclude the corporate patronage. Courts that have considered the question have not denied
Capper-Volstead benefits to an agricultural producer merely because of the form of its organi-
zation. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1966),
reversed on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45, 49-52 (D.D.C. 1958), reversed on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458
(1960). One explanation for the judiciary's tolerance of corporate patronage in the face of
negative legislative history is its recognition that it is not so much the nature of the producer,
but the nature of agriculture, that justifies the Capper-Volstead exemption. See Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). The Fifth Circuit's emphasis on the nature of the producer rather
than the nature of production runs counter to precedent.
222. "[The characteristics necessary to qualify as an actual 'producer' or 'farmer' cannot
be adequately discerned from the legislative history." 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,509, at 67,220.
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becomes apparent only when assessed against the backdrop of the causes of
the problems it was enacted to remedy.
While Congress was unaware of the potential for vertical integration in
1922, it was aware of the market adversities confronting producers of
agricultural products. In particular, Congress was concerned with the in-
equality of bargaining power between producers and the "middlemen" who
controlled their markets. 21 The inequality Was attributable not only to the
size and economic concentration of the middlemen, 224 but also to the
peculiar characteristics of agriculture itself: perishable products, 225 unin-
formed decisionmaking 226 and market volatility caused by unrestrained
production and characterized by gluts and shortages.22 7 Capper-Volstead
was enacted in the hope that producers would use their cooperatives hori-
zontally and vertically to sidestep many of the middlemen altogether.228
Both the producer and the consumer were to benefit.
229
Although farming and farmers have changed, the vicissitudes of farm-
ing do not respect the organizational form of the enterprise. Agricultural
products remain perishable, whether the producer is a family farmer or an
off-farm integrator. Lack of bargaining power is as harmful to the integrator
as to the small farmer. If the market is glutted, the integrator is helpless to
stabilize prices. His production commitments are made in advance and he
must live with the consequences of his decisionmaking. Nowhere has this
223. 62 CONG. REC. 2048 (remarks of Senator Kellogg), 2060 (1922) (remarks of Senator
Capper); 60 id. at 363 (1920) (remarks of Senator Smith).
224. 62 id. 2051 (remarks of Senator Kellogg, quoting a speech delivered by President
Warren G. Harding), 2216 (1922) (remarks of Senator Townsend); 60 id. at 363 (1920) (remarks
of Senator Smith).
225. 62 id. at 2052 (1922) (remarks of Senator Kellogg).
226. "Marketing is always a group problem. No man can intelligently distribute his product
without knowing what the markets will absorb; the amount of that particular commodity grown
in this and other countries; competition of other commodities of similar use or character;
conditions of transportation; possibilities of storage and credits." Id. at 2058-59 (remarks of
Senator Capper). See also id. at 2060 (remarks of Senator Capper).
227. "More and more it has become evident that the growers must have opportunity to
merchandise their products in an orderly way, instead of being compelled to dump them on a
glutted market at prices below cost of production." Id. at 2058 (remarks of Senator Capper).
"[Ylou cannot dump all the production on the country at once and have the farmer receive a
good price." Id. at 2052 (remarks of Senator Kellogg). See also id. at 2262 (remarks of Senator
Hitchcock).
228. "The main object of the cooperative association is to get reasonable prices for the
farmer, principally through lessening the cost of marketing and selling his products and cutting
down the difference between what the farmer receives and what the public finally pays. That is
the main object." Id. at 2049 (remarks of Senator Kellogg). See also id. at 2061 (remarks of
Senator Capper).
229. "If by allowing cooperative understandings we can shorten the distance between
producer and consumer and eliminate the toll gates on the way the farmer and the consumer will
both be benefited." Id. at 2216 (remarks of Senator Townsend). See also id. at 2049 (remarks
of Senator Kellogg), 2257 (remarks of Senator Norris).
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been better illustrated than in the broiler industry, where the continuing
effects of lack of market information, cyclical production, a highly perish-
able product, oligopsonistic markets and price volatility remain visible.
230
The need for horizontal efforts among off-farm integrators can be very
real. It should not be presumed, therefore, that off-farm integrators have no
entitlement to, or need for, Capper-Volstead privileges. As risk-takers in the
production of agricultural commodities, they are subject to the same forces
as the small family farmer and the large-scale individual operator. An
arbitrary barrier to their participation in cooperative associations undermines
congressional purpose.
2. How Broad Is Capper-Volstead?
To find support for the proposition that the applicability of Capper-
Volstead is to be determined by the amount of the agricultural risk taken
rather than by the organizational nature of the producer, one needs only to
document Congress' intent that the Act's coverage be broad. "Persons
engaged in the production of agricultural products" are entitled to the Act's
benefits. These persons may be "farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen,
nut or fruit growers"-so long as they "produce farm products. "231 Noth-
ing on the face of the statute requires farm ownership, and its legislative
history nowhere indicates that land ownership is a precondition to eligibili-
ty. In fact, indications are to the contrary, because tenant farmers and
sharecroppers were included within the definition of "persons.''232 The
sharecropper and the land owner, of course, share the risk of production and
marketing, and Congress indicated that it considered both eligible under the
Act.233 Undoubtedly, sharecroppers assume a greater risk, but the inclusion
230. See text accompanying notes 122-46 supra. Roy suggests that the need for integra-
tion-vertical and horizontal-is a function of the product and the market structure into which
it is sold. For example, he notes that the farm enterprises which have experienced the least
amount of integration are those whose products (a) have long shelf lives and (b) are subject to
federal support programs. E. Roy, supra note 12, at 12. This indicates that the form of the
enterprise is insignificant compared to the nature of the product and its market.
231. 62 CONG. REc. 2052 (1922).
Mr. Cummins. I think the Senator does not exactly catch my point. Take the
flouring mills of Minneapolis. They are engaged, in a broad sense, in the production of
an agricultural product. The packers are engaged, in a broad sense, in the production
of an agricultural product. The Senator does not attempt by this bill to confer upon
them the privileges which the bill grants, I assume?
Mr. Kellogg. Certainly not; and I do not think a proper construction of the bill
grants them any such privileges. The bill covers farmers, people who produce farm
products of all kinds. . ..
Id. (emphasis added).
232. The tenant farmer was considered "our typical American agriculturalist." Id. at 2060
(remarks of Senator Capper). See also id. at 2258-60 (remarks of Senators Norris, Robinson,
and Simmons).
233. See id. at 2060, 2258-60 (remarks of Senators Capper, Norris, and Simmons).
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of owners suggests that Congress appreciated the role the owner played in
supplying or underwriting production inputs, in processing and in market-
ing. It would be anomalous, therefore, to allow the sharecropper-owner
relationship to qualify for Capper-Volstead while excluding the integrator-
grower relationship. The contract grower assumes far less production risk
than his sharecropper counterpart. Furthermore, the evolution of the Cap-
per-Volstead bill through the two Congresses that considered it displays
congressional awareness that agriculture was a complex industry, influenced
by myriad forces, whose problems were not susceptible to elementary
solutions.
The original exemption, section 6 of the Clayton Act, applied only to
nonstock cooperatives.2 34 The need for capital flexibility soon became
apparent, however, and the earliest precursors 235 of the Capper-Volstead
Act expressly provided that capital-stock associations qualified for the
exemption if certain dividend restrictions were observed.
During the three years of congressional deliberations on broadening the
section 6 exemption, 236 culminating in the Capper-Volstead Act, not only
were organizational requirements relaxed, but certain provisions were added
to authorize cooperatives to engage in increasingly diversified activities,
including processing, preparing for market and handling. By giving a green
light to these activities, Congress facilitated the goal of moving com-
modities from the fields to the consumers' tables without undue intervention
from middlemen. Indeed, the final version of the proposed bill gave
cooperatives the authority to deal in the products of nonmembers, 237 even
234. See note 46 supra.
235. S. 845, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Labor, Agricultural, Dairy, and Horticultural Organiza-
tions: Hearings on S. 845 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 845] (1919); H.R. 7783, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
236. See Collective Bargaining for Farmers: Hearings on H.R. 7783 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R.
7783]; Hearings on S. 845, supra note 235; Association of Producers of Agricultural Products:
Hearings on S. 4344 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1920) [hereinafter cited as Hearn'gs on S. 4344], Authorizing Association ofProducers of
Agricultural Products: Hearings on H.R. 2373 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2373]. H.R. 7783
and S. 845, see text accompanying note 235 supra, were introduced in 1919 as amendments to §
6 of the Clayton Act. A few months after the conclusion of hearings on S. 845, H.R. 13931,66th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), and S. 4344, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings on S. 4344, supra at 5
(1920), were introduced. Both houses passed versions of these bills. There were, however,
certain disagreements related to § 2 of the bill (anti-price enhancement and monopoly), and
neither version became law. These bills were reintroduced in the next session, however, and
were enacted into law as the Capper-Volstead Act. See generally J. SHIDELAR, supra note 41, at
113-14.
237. Restrictions were placed on the amount of nonmember products that could be dealt in
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over the objections of some that such power might be subject to abuse.
238
A further indication of Congress' conscious latitude in Capper-Vol-
stead activities is the important role that it left to the states in determining
the nature of the cooperative and in defining the scope of its activities--even
though certain state laws then in existence would permit wealthy capitalists
to take advantage of the proposed exemption. 239 Furthermore, it was obvi-
ous that cooperatives organized under the aegis of various state corporation
or cooperative statutes would have diverse forms and different powers. 
240
Yet Congress expressly eschewed the fabrication of a monolithic standard to
which all cooperative activity had to conform. Instead, a set of broad
guidelines was laid down. Within the bounds of these guidelines producers
were encouraged to develop the forms of organization and methods of
operation that were best suited to the economic conditions confronting
them.
241
It is evident that in creating a means by which producers could respond
to the market disabilities confronting them in 1922, Congress had no
intention of ossifying the vehicle at the moment of its creation. Congress
was well aware that the economy would continue to evolve and that produ-
cers would have to adapt if they were to function effectively in an ever-
changing arena. 242 Congress did not stop with the Capper-Volstead Act. It
went on to create other means of facilitating the adaptation of farming to the
twentieth century, most notably the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926243
and the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929.2 4
Congress was fully aware that its broad grant might create the potential
for competitive abuses.2 45 Nonetheless, it felt the need to give producers
latitude in responding to the problems confronting them. Rather than estab-
lish inflexible rules that might stifle legitimate and beneficial development
by a cooperative. "[The association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an
amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members." 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
238. See Hearings on H.R. 2373, supra note 236, at 27-28; 62 CONG. REC. 2156-57 (1922).
239. Hearings on H.R. 2373, supra note 236, at 185, 189.
240. 62 CONG. REc. 2120-21 (1922); H.R. REP. No. 24, supra note 42.
241. Hearings on S. 845, supra note 236, at 56 (statement by Senator Norris).
242. 62 CONG. REC. 2061 (1922) (remarks of Senator Capper); 59 id. at 8025 (1919) (remarks
of Mr. Hersman).
243. 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-457 (1970). The 1926 Act, with the additional qualifying language
emphasized, reads as follows: "Persons engaged, as original producers of agricultural prod-
ucts, such as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers .... " Id. (empha-
sis added). The slight alteration of language suggests that Congress intended to include a broad
spectrum of agricultural producers.
244. 12 id. §§ 1141b-1141j; see text accompanying notes 54-57, 60 supra.
245. See 62 CONG. REc. 2172 (remarks of Senator Brandegee), 2225 (1922) (remarks of
Senator Lenroot).
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in the organization or operation of the agricultural sector, Congress respond-
ed with an expansive grant in order "to make the provisions of the bill
sufficiently liberal so that all cooperative farm associations operating in
good faith for the benefit of its members might avail themselves of the
provisions of this bill.' '246 While Congress was aware that its grant was
perhaps overbroad, it was confident that, should any abuses come to light, it
would have ample power and opportunity to deal with those problems at a
later time.
247
The Fifth Circuit failed to perceive the breadth allowed by the Act
when it determined that "Congress carefully limited the benefits of the Act
to 'farmers.' "248 That is not the case. The Act covers the widest range of
persons involved in the production (as opposed to mere processing) of
agricultural products. 249 The Fifth Circuit, by emphasizing the word "farm-
er," overly restricts the operation of the Act to the end that the congression-
al design is threatened with frustration. It is no answer to state "[i]f there are
good reasons why broiler integrators should be protected against the general
national policy of free competition, then NBMA should present those
reasons to Congress." 0 Congress has already indicated that while its
inclusion of all producers might be overbroad, they remain covered by the
Act until Congress acts to exclude them. By ignoring the congressional
framework, the Fifth Circuit usurped a function Congress arguably reserved
to itself.251
246. H.R. REP. No. 24, supra note 42, at I.
247. 62 CONG. REC. 2168 (1922) (remarks of Senator Walsh); 60 id. at 363 (1920) (remarks of
Senators Simmons and Kellogg).
248. 550 F.2d at 1390.
249. Another example of the intended broad coverage of the Capper-Volstead Act can be
found in the treatment accorded Messrs. Armour, Swift and Wilson. The Clayton Act debates
manifest undisguised hositility toward the large meat packing trusts. "Why is it that none of
these men are wearing stripes in the penitentary?" 51 CONG. REC. 9546 (1914) (remarks of
Representative Quin). Moreover, the meat packing industry had previously been the subject of
antitrust sanctions for restrictive trade practices and attempted monopolizations. Swift & Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Messrs. Armour, Swift and Wilson could hardly have
suggested themselves as persons deserving congressional solicitude in the matter of the anti-
trust laws. Even with this background, and despite understandable distrust of their motives,
Congress expressly contemplated that these gentlemen, if they engaged in the production of
agricultural products, could join or form an agricultural cooperative. 62 CONo. REc. 2157 (1922)
(remarks of Senator Walsh). Furthermore, a suggestion that Capper-Volstead be limited to
those "primarily engaged" in agriculture was debated down. Hearings on H.R. 2373, supra
note 236, at 195.
250. 550 F.2d at 1391.
251. Other courts have followed this approach when agricultural exemptions are involved:
"The social and economic problems related to large-scale corporate farming are more appropri-
ately resolved by debate and committee study in Congress than by adversary proceedings in
court. If Congress is troubled by the reasoning. . . . it is free to translate its intent into clearer
legislation." NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1972).
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3. Traditional Antitrust Rationale
Whether the rationale behind the antitrust exemption is still wholesome
is a matter of current public debate. 2 Even if the rationale is dated and
Capper-Volstead does need overhauling, it is incongruous to put agricultural
producers with similar characteristics, and whose position vis-a-vis the
market is substantially similar, in different categories for antitrust purposes
simply because their organizational forms are different.
From an antitrust standpoint, cooperative associations of off-farm in-
tegrators may present less of an anticompetitive threat than most associa-
tions of on-farm producers. When on-farm producers associate, competition
occurs only in the production stage. After the production stage is completed,
handling, processing, marketing and distribution functions are administered
cooperatively. With off-farm integrators, however, competition is preserved
throughout many levels. In the case of NBMA, for example, the various
integrator members compete at the input, production, handling, processing
and distribution stages. The only area in which they purport 253 to work
cooperatively is in marketing. Because of multilevel competition in the
vertically integrated enterprise, the incentives for innovation, optimal prod-
uction scales and cost controls are broader and more beneficial.254
Whatever the Fifth Circuit's reasons for excluding "agribusiness"
from eligibility in a Capper-Volstead cooperative, it certainly cannot be that
off-farm integrators are immune to the caprice of the marketplace. The
252. See, e.g., Food Price Investigation, supra note 163, at 8 (testimony of T. Kauper,
Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Family Farm Act Hearings, supra note
8, at 14 (remarks of Representative McClory); L. KRAVITZ, WHO'S MINDING THE Coop? A
REPORT ON FARMER CONTROL OF FARMER COOPERATIVES (Agribusiness Accountability Project,
1974); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 10-13; Statement of Donald 1. Baker, supra
note 52, at 16-18.
253. The specific purpose of NBMA was marketing, and the function of the association
was largely limited to dissemination of market information as provided in 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
254. Anticompetitive behavior is most likely to result from horizontal rather than vertical
integration. The former "may reduce the number of competitors" while the latter "may add to
competition." E. Roy, supra note 12, at 19. In any event, "If vertical integration is based on
excessive horizontal integration, it may be wiser for society to attack the horizontal combina-
tions rather than to focus solely on the vertical." Id. (emphasis added). This is especially true
when the vertical integration is achieved through contract farming. Id. It is therefore unwise to
presume that a producer is anticompetitive just because it is vertically integrated. The inquiry
should be leveled at the market power of the horizontally integrated association of producers
and whether this market power is exercised in conjunction with true "non-farmers," Maryland
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 457 (1960); United States v. Borden
Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939), or by use of coercive and predatory practices, Knuth v. Erie-
Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973);
Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967); Case-Swayne
Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384
(1967); North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965).
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enunciated purposes of Capper-Volstead can be as applicable to a vertically
integrated enterprise as to the on-farm producer. Furthermore, the Capper-
Volstead benefits sought by vertically integrated firms probably entail less
anticompetitive potential than those sought by on-farm producers. Off-farm
integrators, as long as they take substantial risks in the production area,
should be allowed to avail themselves of the benefits of cooperation. A
means must therefore be devised to control access to the benefits of the
Capper-Volstead Act in order to exclude undeserving entities and to main-
tain the delicate balance between the antitrust laws and the special agricul-
tural exemption.
C. A Standard for Determining Which Off-Farm Integrators Shall
Be Allowed To Form or Join Agricultural Cooperatives
In enacting the Capper-Volstead Act, Congress made a determination
that, for antitrust purposes, agriculture was fundamentally different from
other capitalistic enterprises.25 5 This difference, attributable to special cir-
cumstances and hazards, legitimized a "price and production policy...
different from that which underlies the demands made upon industry and
commerce by anti-trust laws." s2 5 6 Depending on the production risks they
assume, off-farm integrators may be no less deserving of privileged treat-
ment than family farmers. It is not the "ownership or operation of a farm"
that justifies special treatment, but the nature of agriculture in general. In
distinguishing eligible producers from ineligible producers, the principal
focus should be on determining whether, in a given situation, the special
circumstances of agriculture that first necessitated passage of remedial
legislation exist.
Agriculture, because of its singular nature, has been afforded different
treatment not only by the antitrust laws, but by the Internal Revenue Code,
the Interstate Commerce Act25 7 and the Fair Labor Standards Act258 as well.
255. As the late Lyman S. Hulbert wrote,
Agriculture is fundamentally different from industry. The number engaged in agricul-
ture or any branch thereof, the distances which separate them, the conditions incident
to the production of agricultural products, inherent difficulties involved in controlling
acreage, the variableness of production from climatic causes-the caprice of the
seasons, and the number of agricultural products that may be substituted for each
other seem to afford reasonable bases for classification.
L. HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 177 (FCS Bull. No. 10, 1958).
256. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 146 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.). "Since Connolly's case
[Connolly v. Union SewerPipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902)] was decided, nearly forty years ago, an
impressive legislative movement bears witness to general acceptance of the view that the
differences between agriculture and industry call for differentiation in the formulation of public
policy .... 310 U.S. at 145.
257. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970).
258. 29 id. §§ 201-219.
1978] AGRJCULTURAL COOPERATIVES
While these statutory schemes might single out agriculture because of some
policy determinations unrelated to those embodied in Capper-Volstead, they
nonetheless are affected with a common "raison d'etre" 259 germane to the
special needs of agriculture in an imperfectly competitive economy. It is
instructive, therefore, to investigate how courts have approached the task of
determining whether off-farm integrators qualify as "producers" for the
purposes of these kindred statutory schemes.
Section 521 of the Internal Revenue Code2 6 exempts farmers' coopera-
tives from federal income taxation so long as they are operated for the
benefit of "members" or other "producers." The term "producer" has
been defined as one who "as an owner or tenant . . . bears the risks of
production, cultivates, operates, or manages a farm for gain or profit-in
short, [one who] is engaged in the trade or business of farming." 261 The
cases and revenue rulings that have considered the definition of "producer"
indicate that the key factor is the entrepreneur's exposure to the risk of profit
fluctuation, which is a risk caused by weather, disease, market demand or
similar factors.
Farmers Co-Operative Creamery v. Commissioner262 held that the
farm owner who operates his farm through tenants on a crop-sharing basis
qualified as a "producer" because he "risks his capital, furnishes seed and
takes his chances on profits in much the same manner as he would were he
to hire the work done for wages.'"263
259. Cf. Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Education, 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973) (provisions of
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 and Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be given same
construction due to common raison d'etre). Without fear of over-generalization, it is safe to say
that there is an overall national agricultural policy which is consistently reflected in the body of
laws: antitrust, securities, corporate, commercial, labor, tax, environmental and others. While
these laws deal with diverse topics, their substance vis-a-vis agriculture is governed by the
special circumstances of agriculture. This common thread imbues policies behind one set of
laws somewhat probative of the policies behind other sets of laws. Caution should be exercised
to not misjudge the purpose of one act by applying the totally different standards adopted by
another, FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60,
69 (1940), but neither should the obvious interfacings of congressional intent be ignored. United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1940).
260. I.R.C. § 521. In particular, § 521 exempts farmers' cooperatives from income tax to
the extent they are "farmers', fruit growers' or like associations organized and operated on a
cooperative basis. . . for the purpose," inter alia, "of marketing the products of members or
other producers." Id. § 521(a), (b). Section 521 seemingly adopts the Capper-Volstead meaning
of cooperative. See Treas. Reg. § 1.521-1(a)(1) (1958). However, the statute does not expressly
define "farmer" or "producer."
261. Rev. Rul. 67-422, 1967-2 C.B. 217, 218 (emphasis added).
262. 21 B.T.A. 265 (1930), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 4.
263. Id. at 268; accord, Dr. P. Phillips Coop. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1002, 1009 (1951)
(test is whether taxpayer "might fairly be regarded as having taken the risks and responsibilities
of the owner of a growing crop"). Various revenue rulings have also embraced the risk test.
Rev. Rul. 67-422, supra note 261, specified that a producer "bears the risk of production." It
illustrates the point by distinguishing between persons receiving percentage rentals and those
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The risk test has also been adopted for determining who is a "farmer"
for purposes of the special income reporting regulations promulgated under
section 471 of the Internal Revenue Code. 264 In defining the word "farm,"
the regulations provide: "As used in this section, the term 'farm' embraces
the farm in the ordinarily accepted sense . ... "265 Three cases involving
off-farm integrators have afforded the courts the opportunity to determine
what the "ordinarily accepted sense" is.
In United States v. Chemell,266 the government contended that "farm-
er," in its ordinary sense, referred only to "persons engaged in tilling the
soil, and in raising and marketing crops, dairy products and livestock as a
part of the farm economy.' '267 Integrated production (using growing con-
tracts), by contrast, was but an incident of farming, "a commercial and
industrial activity by mechanical means," 268 especially when the taxpayer-
integrators "did not own or lease any farm lands." 269 Rejecting the govern-
ment's argument, the court ruled that lack of land ownership was inconse-
quential. Farmer status was conferred by significant participation in the
various stages of the production process.
270
receiving fixed rentals. "[A] person who receives a fixed rental or other fixed compensation
(without reference to production) is not a producer." Id. at 218. But, "A person who receives a
rental (either in cash or in kind) which is based upon farm production is engaged in the trade or
business of farming, and hence is a producer ...." Id.
Rev. Rul. 72-589, 1972-2 C.B. 282, reaffirmed and amplified Rev. Rul. 67-422. Focusing on
a similar problem, Rev. Rul. 72-589 emphasized the importance of bearing "the risks and
responsibilities of a growing crop."
While not explicitly mentioning risk, Rev. Rul. 58-483, 1958-2 C.B. 277, ruled that when a
feed dealer furnishes poultry and feed to a grower, who then raises the poultry and returns it to
the dealer for marketing through a farmers' cooperative association of which both are patrons,
both the feed dealer and the grower are producers. The implicit ground for this ruling is the
dealer's entrepreneurial risk in the transaction.
I.R.C. § 175 allows taxpayers "engaged in the business of farming" to deduct soil and
water conservation expenditures as current expenses rather than capital items. Treas. Reg.
1.175-3 (1957) states that a taxpayer is "engaged in the business of farming" when he "culti-
vates, operates or manages a farm for gain or profit." The regulation suggests a risk element as
a determining criterion. Thus, one who leases his farmland and receives rental (in cash or in
kind) which is based upon production is held to be engaged in the business of farming. One who
receives a set rental irrespective of production is not unless he participates materially in the
actual management of the farm. Id. What distinguishes the farmer from the non-farmer, then, is
the element of risk associated with the tying of rental to production.
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(a) (1958) provides: "A farmer may make his return upon an
inventory method instead of the cash receipts and disbursements method. It is optional with the
taxpayer which of these methods of accounting is used ...."
265. Id. § 1.61-4(d) (1957). Furthermore, "farmers" include all "individuals, partnerships,
or corporations that cultivate, operate, or manage farms for gain or profit, either as owners or
tenants." Id.
266. 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957).
267. Id. at 946.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 947.
270. The maintaining of a flock of hens producing eggs to be hatched into chicks and
the growing of feed are agricultural pursuits and are parts of an integrated operation.
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The Chemell holding has been reinforced by the decision in Maple
Leaf Farms v. Commissioner.a71 As in Chemell, the issue was whether the
off-farm integrator was a "farmer. "272 The Tax Court concluded that it was
for two reasons. First, the integrator "participated to a significant degree in
the growing process" 273 because it provided feed, medicines and vaccines,
retained title to the commodity and used fieldmen to supervise the grow-
out. 274 Secondly, the integrator "bore a substantial risk of loss,''275 includ-
ing the risk of losing the commodity produced2 76 and the risk of market
uncertainty. 277 While the integrator did not assume the total risk of loss, "on
balance. . . the petitioner assumed a risk of loss from the growing process
of sufficient magnitude to satisfy this element of the 'farmer' formula. One
need not bear all the risks -of loss to be considered a farmer. '278
Finally, Garth v. Commissioner27 9 involved a large off-farm integrator
who used contract growers. The government did not dispute that Garth's
operations constituted farming. Pointing to the size and scope of the opera-
tions, however, the government argued that Garth was not a farmer "in the
ordinarily accepted sense.' '280 The court ruled that farming was farming,
and that the size and scope of the operation was irrelevant as long as its
nature was agricultural.
281
Thus, on the basis of decisions and rulings under the tax laws and
regulations, it is clear that a "farmer" is defined by: (1) The degree of
involvement in the production process, regardless of the size and scope of
The government submits that these portions of the taxpayers' activities were minor
and incidental. The taxpayers insist that their activities in connection with breeding
and raising of their own laying flocks were essential and were a major and important
part of the chick hatching business. We think the evidence sustained the taxpayers'
position.
Id. at 948-49.
271. 64 T.C. 438 (1975), acq. 1975-47 I.R.B. 6.
272. Id. at 447.
273. Id. at 448.
274. Id. at 448-49.
275. Id. at 448.
276. "The unforeseen loss of a flock is the major risk in poultry raising. "Id. at 450.
277. Another risk assumed by the petitioner involved market uncertainties. Petitioner
could have been caught in the middle of rising or falling prices for the ducklings, feed,
and medication it purchased and the ducks it sold, as its debits and credits to the
growers were unaffected by such changes. By way of contrast, the grower knew in
advance what the measure of debits and credits to his account would be. That spread
was locked up and, indeed, the lack of risk thus effectuated was a primary reason for
the grower to participate.
Id. at 450-51.
278. Id. at451.
279. 56 T.C. 610, appeal dismissed, [1971] 6 FED. TAXES (P-H) 61,000, at 61,004 (5th Cir.
1971).
280. Id. at 619.
281. Id.
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his overall operation, and (2) the assumption of risk of loss of the agricultur-
al product itself.
A case under the Interstate Commerce Act282 was decided on similar
grounds. The Interstate Commerce Act exempts from regulation "motor
vehicles controlled and operated by a cooperative association as defined in
the Agricultural Marketing Act." 283 The Agricultural Marketing Act
284
defines the term "cooperative association" to mean associations of "farm-
ers. "285 Whether off-farm integrators are "farmers" for the purposes of the
Agricultural Marketing Act and the Interstate Commerce Act was addressed
in Agricultural Transportation Association of Texas v. United States.
2 86
The Association hauled the products of its members, some of whom
were integrators whose supply came from contract growers. Claiming that
the products produced by contract growers were not the products of the
members, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the Associa-
tion to cease and desist from its transportation of agricultural commodities in
interstate commerce for compensation on the theory that one-half of the
Association's revenues were generated from transportation services done for
nonmembers. At the hearing stage, the ICC held broadly that "actual
ownership or operation of farms is a prerequisite to qualify an individual
organization as a farmer.' '287 The reviewing court, however, disagreed and
ruled that contract growing did not disqualify an integrator from being a
farmer as long as the integrator is substantially involved in the various stages
of agricultural production, including the growout stage, and assumes the
risk of loss of the product.
288
Like the Internal Revenue Code and Interstate Commerce Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)289 singles out agriculture for special treatment.
That Act sets minimum wage and maximum hour standards for most
282. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970).
283. Id. § 303(b)(5).
284. 12 id. § 1141b-1141j.
285. The full definition reads:
[A]ny association in which farmers act together in processing, preparing for market,
handling, and/or marketing the farm products of persons so engaged, and . . . any
association in which farmers act together in purchasing, testing, grading, processing,
distributing, and/or furnishing farm supplies and/or farm business services ....
Id. § 1141(j)(a).
286. 274 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
287. Id. at 532.
288. The processor contracting with small farmers for the production of raw materials
which furnishes seed and fertilizer, supplies financing, closely supervises the actual
growing of crops or raising-of cattle, assumes the risk of loss, and which is the legal
owner of the crop or head of cattle, is entitled to qualify as a farmer. . . . We
distinguish this processor from the one which contracts merely to get a "price." The
latter is little more than a promoter.
Id. at 536.
289. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
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employees. "[E]mployee[s] employed in agriculture," 290 however, are ex-
empted from the Act's coverage. Numerous cases have arisen under FLSA
in which the central issue has been whether employees of off-farm inte-
grators are covered by the Act. 291 The NLRB has consistently taken the
position, as has the Justice Department in the Chicken Case, that the use of
contract growers renders the integrator a nonfarmer. 292 "The argument is
that the fact that respondent uses the independent growers destroys its claim
to having raised the bird; that respondent is more akin to the purchaser of the
bird." 2
93
In a bevy of FLSA cases courts have ruled that integrators are "farm-
ers" for purposes of the wage and hour exemptions. Central to their
decisions were findings that the integrator retained title to the agricultural
product throughout the production stage, 294 was substantially involved in the
production process since it supplied most, if not all, of the production inputs
and decisionmaking, 295 bore the risk of loss of the agricultural product and
production inputs at all times,296 and provided production initiatives that the
contract growers would never have provided on their own. 297 These cases
acknowledged the fact that the role of the contract grower, while integral to
production, was dwarfed by the overall production activities of the inte-
grators.
290. Id § 213(a)(6). "Agriculture" is defined in § 3(f) of the Act: "'Agriculture' includes
farming in all its branches. . . and any practices. . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as an
incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market,
delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation tQ market." Id. § 203(f).
291. McElrath Poultry Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Abbott Farms, Inc. v.
NLRB, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Tyson's
Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1966); Nix v. Farmers Mut. Exch., 218 F.2d 642 (5th Cir.
1955); Miller Hatcheries, Inc. v. Boyer, 131 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1942); Mitchell v. Georgia Broiler
Supply Co., 186 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
292. See McElrath Poultry Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Abbott Farms, Inc.
v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969).
293. NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1969).
294. Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904, 904 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Victor
Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 20 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405
F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Tyson's Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255, 257, 259-61 (8th
Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Georgia Broiler Supply, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 341, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
295. Abbott Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904, 904 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Victor
Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 20 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405
F.2d 1025, 1030-32 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Tyson's Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255,257, 260-61 (8th
Cir. 1966); Nix v. Farmers Mut. Exch., 218 F.2d 642, 644 (5th Cir. 1955); Miller
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Boyer, 131 F.2d 283,285 (8th Cir. 1942); Mitchell v. Georgia Broiler Supply,
Inc., 186 F. Supp. 341, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
296. NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v.
Tyson's Poultry, Inc., 355 F.2d 255, 257, 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1966).
297. NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1031 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v.
Tyson's Poultry Inc., 355 F.2d 255, 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1966).
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The authority of these cases may have been weakened by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB.298 In
Bayside, a vertically integrated poultry producer refused to bargain with a
union representing its truckdrivers. The drivers transported poultry feed
from a company owned feed mill to the farms of contract growers. Section
2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)299 exempts "agricultural
laborers" from the Act. The meaning of "agricultural laborer," however, is
tied to the meaning of "agriculture" and "farmer" under the FLSA. 300
Thus, Bayside indirectly presented the issue passed upon by the courts in
the FLSA cases: what is a "farmer" for the purposes of a federal labor law
exemption? After a hearing, the NLRB ruled that the truck drivers were not
agricultural laborers and, hence, not exempt from the Act.301 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 3°2
Mr. Justice Stevens, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, reject-
ed Bayside's contention that its truck drivers were agricultural laborers. The
Court determined that the drivers' status could be ascertained by the
"character of the employer's activities." ' 30 3 Rather than looking at Bay-
side's activities as a single, vertically integrated agricultural operation,
however, the Court divided Bayside's production system into its component
parts. 3°4 The transportation of feed by the drivers from feed mill to contract
grower was one of these components. The Court, viewing this activity in
isolation from the rest of the system, found it to be nonagricultural and held
for the NLRB.305
Central to the decision is the Court's subdivision of Bayside's business
into agricultural and nonagricultural components, despite the violence there-
by done to the concept of vertical integration. The very purpose of vertical
integration is to coordinate the otherwise disjointed components of a pro-
duction system. 306 When that system is geared toward the production of a
product of a specific character, such as an agricultural commodity, it is
arguable that the character of its component parts should be colored by the
ultimate goal of the system. Otherwise, any vertically integrated business
can be picked apart component by component, with each component having
298. 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
299. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
300. Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. at 300; 29 U.S.C. § 203(0 (1970).
301. 216 N.L.R.B. 502 (1975).
302. 527 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1975).
303. 429 U.S. at 301.
304. Id. at 301-02.
305. Id. at 302-04.
306. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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a different legal status. This approach not only refuses to recognize vertical
integration for what it is, but also threatens to undermine its benefits.
Bayside should be restricted to cases arising under the NLRA. Both the
Capper-Volstead Act and the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 sanction
vertical integration. 30 7 It would be anomalous indeed for the Supreme Court
to decide the Chicken Case on the basis of a component by component
approach when Congress has encouraged the combination of production
stages into a vertically integrated system. In the context of Capper-Volstead,
the best guide for distinguishing farmers from nonfarmers remains the risk
of loss test. Risk is the basis of the Capper-Volstead legislative classifica-
tion, and even if previous FLSA cases do not retain vitality after Bayside as
to FLSA questions, they nonetheless should remain authoritative for Cap-
per-Volstead purposes.
If the remedial goals of cooperation are to be safeguarded against ex-
ploitation, and if the anticompetitive evils of cooperation are to be held in
check, then a workable means of distinguishing farmers from nonfarmers
must be formulated. In perfecting a standard, utmost attention must be given
to the realities of commercial agriculture that inspired the lawmakers to treat
it specially. Failure to do so is likely to produce results that contravene the
underlying purposes of cooperative legislation and to affect adversely ag-
ricultural growth and modernization. This is precisely the mistake made by
the Fifth Circuit in the Chicken Case, where the ultimate test of eligibility is
economically meaningless in view of the many ways in which it can be
circumvented.
Based on the legislative history of the cooperative acts and kindred
statutes in the labor, tax and interstate commerce areas, a preferred test for
determining eligibility would take into account the following criteria:
1. The degree of direct involvement by the producer in the production
of the commodity, including supply of inputs and production adjuncts. If the
involvement in the production process is partially contracted out to growers,
the degree of direct or indirect supervisory control over the growout stage
should be assessed.
2. The degree to which the risk of losing the value of the production
is borne by the integrator. While the risk may be shared in some degree with
a tenant, sharecropper or grower, the greater share of risk should be borne
by the integrator. The prime indicator of risk is financial responsibility for
inputs and adjuncts and ownership of the commodity throughout the pro-
duction process.
307. See text accompanying notes 48-57 supra.
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The application of this two-fold test should be sufficient to determine
whether the off-farm integrator stands in sufficient relation to the forces of
agriculture to justify his access to the benefits of cooperation.
III. CONCLUSION
The growth and development of vertically integrated enterprises have
exerted a positive influence on American agriculture. Better products pro-
duced by advanced technology at lower cost have benefited both the
producing and consuming sectors of the economy. Nowhere has the track
record been as impressive as in the broiler industry.
At the same time, off-farm integrators have discovered that the ef-
ficiencies of vertical integration are not always sufficient to insure the
viability of the enterprise. Without horizontal power and coordination, the
perishability of the product, the volatility of price, the ever-present inscruta-
bility of the market and the lack of bargaining power in oligopsonistic
markets adversely affect the operations of family farmers and off-farm
integrators alike. The tendency, however, has been to presume that off-farm
integrators are excluded from the benefits of cooperation. This presumption,
if perpetuated, might precipitate costly consequences, the tab for which
eventually will be borne by the consumer.
The plea of this article is one for reflection, analysis, de-stereotyping
and abstention from presumptions founded on unwarranted prejudices. The
Chicken Case has cast a pall over the continued growth of vertically
integrated enterprises in all fields of agriculture, even though the farm
ownership or operation criterion used by the Fifth Circuit is easily circum-
vented-at sacrifice of the independence of thousands of contract growers
who participate in the production process. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
ruling tends to insulate, temporarily anyway, large-scale producers and
producer-based cooperatives from competition. Many of these producers
share the same size and organizational attributes manifested by off-farm
enterprises.
The Fifth Circuit's solution comports with neither congressional intent
nor prudent antitrust policy. The very premise upon which the Capper-
Volstead rationale is founded is the extraordinarily risky nature of farming.
Land ownership, in this day of extensive land leasing and tenantry, has little
bearing on the risks of the marketplace. It is senseless to require modern
farmers to own land when it is cheaper to lease it. It is likewise unwise to
require a producer to "operate a farm" when the day to day administrative
tedium of running a farm can be contracted out to efficient growers.
[Vol. 56
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One hopes that the Supreme Court will restore to the broiler industry-
and integrated agriculture in general-the incentives to build a better
mousetrap. In the meantime, the Justice Department and the Department of
Agriculture should take a hard look at the Fifth Circuit decision for what it
really is and devise a more realistic approach to the enhancement of compe-
tition and the development of more efficient production systems.
76 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
